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ABSTRACT 
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA) prohibits a 
videotape service provider from knowingly disclosing the personally 
identifiable information (PII) of a purchaser, renter, or subscriber to 
a third party. This legislation was created to protect consumers’ 
privacy. In the last decade, use of the Internet for most daily tasks 
has skyrocketed, and individuals’ methods for acquiring video 
content have not been immune to this transition. With the increase in 
technology use to obtain video materials came the need to evaluate 
whether a user of a free cell phone app qualifies as a subscriber—an 
undefined term within the VPPA—who would be afforded the Act’s 
information-privacy protections. The First and Eleventh Circuits 
addressed this issue with conflicting outcomes. 
In order to give effect to the original intent of the VPPA in this 
current era of digital downloads, an individual who downloads a 
free cell phone app and provides valuable PII to the video content 
provider in exchange for otherwise free video content should be 
considered a subscriber under the Act and afforded the Act’s 
protections because the PII provided functions as consideration to 
form a contract between the parties. Due to the highly effective 
nature of targeted advertisements, PII has enormous value. It is 
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bought and sold in a booming market and thus can function as 
consideration to form a contractual relationship between the 
consumer and video content provider. This relationship of 
heightened significance evidences a meaningful commitment between 
the parties, thereby affording the app user the status of subscriber 
and information-privacy protections under the VPPA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision on August 29, 
2016 removed many existing forms of privacy protection from 
Americans’ personal information.1 In a case between the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC)—known as “the government’s top privacy 
watchdog”2—and AT&T, a telecommunications conglomerate and 
“common carrier,”3 the court determined that the FTC can no longer 
halt common carriers’ questionable personal data collection4 because 
such regulation is outside of the FTC’s jurisdiction.5 This ruling 
broadly forbids the FTC from regulating any part of an entity that 
provides phone or Internet service6 and left the task of regulating 
                                                 
 1. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 835 F.3d 
993 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 2. Brian Fung, This Court Ruling Is a ‘Fatal Blow’ to Consumer 




 3. A common carrier is “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, 
in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign 
radio transmission of energy.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012).  
 4. See Fung, supra note 2. This case commenced when the FTC 
challenged the sufficiency of AT&T’s disclosure to its customers regarding the 
speed of their data plans. See id. The FTC accused AT&T of “data throttling,” a 
process of slowing down the speed of the data provided to its unlimited data plan 
customers once they reach a particular threshold amount of data. See AT&T, 835 
F.3d at 995. While this decision was not directly about data collection, by 
completely removing AT&T and other common carriers from the FTC’s 
jurisdiction, this case set the important precedent that the FTC can no longer 
regulate common carrier companies. See Fung, supra note 2. 
 5. See AT&T, 835 F.3d at 1003. Before this ruling, it was generally 
understood that the FTC could regulate privacy issues arising from common carrier 
businesses as long as it avoided regulating activities directly related to common 
carrier functions. See Fung, supra note 2. At its inception, the FTC was empowered 
to regulate unfair competition and deceptive actions in many areas of commerce but 
specifically restricted from regulating common carriers. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) 
(2012). 
 6. See Fung, supra note 2. This is of particular concern because now any 
company can entirely remove itself from the purview of FTC by engaging in any 
operations that would give it a common carrier label. See id.  
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common carriers to the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC).7 Taking privacy regulation of common carriers out of the 
hands of the FTC puts a lot of pressure on the FCC.8 While the FCC 
has been developing privacy rules for Internet service providers, 
such new rules will not regulate content providers, also known as 
“edge providers.”9  
In light of the FCC’s and FTC’s new limitations, concern is 
growing over who will have jurisdiction over future information-
privacy issues.10 Even more worrisome is the possibility that such 
jurisdictional issues will become discoverable loopholes for 
providers to evade oversight.11 These notable gaps in consumer 
privacy regulation increase the importance of statutorily provided 
privacy protection.12 An important piece of privacy legislation that 
can fill these gaps between the FTC’s and FCC’s powers is the 
Video Privacy Protection Act.13 
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA) prohibits a 
videotape service provider from knowingly disclosing a consumer’s 
                                                 
 7. See id. Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 gave the FCC 
authority over all common carriers and authority to regulate much of their activities. 
See Frank W. Lloyd, Cable Television’s Emerging Two-Way Services: A Dilemma 
for Federal and State Regulators, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (1983). 
 8. See Fung, supra note 2; see also Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 535, 540 (2010). The original intent in establishing the FCC was 
“to oversee telephone and radio services. Today, its jurisdiction covers a broad 
collection of major industries, including broadcasting, telephone service, mobile 
phones, satellite communications, and cable television.” Id. 
 9. Edge providers are defined as an “individual or entity that provides any 
content, application, or service over the Internet, and any individual or entity that 
provides a device used for accessing any content, application, or service over the 
Internet.” 47 C.F.R. § 8.2(b) (2017). See also Debra Diener, New FCC Regulations 
May Not Give Consumers True Online Privacy Protection, TECHCRUNCH.COM (June 
23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/23/new-fcc-regulations-may-not-give-
consumers-true-online-privacy-protection/ [https://perma.cc/27ZY-J5YN] 
(explaining that “the fundamental mistake in the way the FCC has framed the 
proposal [is] Google, Facebook, Amazon and a myriad of other ‘edge providers’ are 
not covered by the eventual privacy rules that will be drafted”). 
 10. See Fung, supra note 2 (explaining that it is possible for a company’s 
action to fall between FTC and FCC oversight and potentially be left unregulated).  
 11. See id. For example, there is concern that “any company [could] evade 
FTC oversight simply by launching or buying a small telecom service.” Id. 
 12. See id. Fung notes that “[b]etween the FCC’s inability to regulate much 
beyond the communications-related units of a company and the FTC’s newfound 
prohibition on regulating any part of a company that owns a communications 
business, the 9th Circuit decision creates a gap in consumer protection law . . . .” Id. 
 13. See generally Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 
(2012). 
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personally identifiable information (PII)14 to a third party.15 The Act 
only protects the PII of “consumers,” which it defines as purchasers, 
renters, or subscribers of video content.16 The VPPA was created 
“[t]o preserve personal privacy with respect to the rental, purchase or 
delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials.”17 While 
VHS tapes are a thing of the past, protecting consumers’ information 
is an enduring task.18 Further, although online transactions were not 
within the original scope of the VPPA,19 the Act’s 2012 amendments 
help it address the needs of an online world.20  
The VPPA has a renewed importance in light of the 
questionable and more limited scope of protection currently provided 
by the FTC21 and the FCC22 because this Act can protect the privacy 
of individuals consuming video content from common carrier edge 
                                                 
 14. According to the VPPA, PII “includes information which identifies a 
person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a 
video tape service provider.” Id.  
 15. Id. The Act states that “[a] video tape service provider who knowingly 
discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any 
consumer of such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person.” Id.  
 16. See id. (defining consumer as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of 
goods or services from a video tape service provider”). 
 17. Id.; see also Video and Library Privacy Protection Act of 1988: Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Technology and the 
Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 29-30 (1988). This legislation 
was created to protect individuals’ privacy in their video-watching choices, and the 
legislators indicated that what “we’re trying to protect with this legislation are usage 
records of content-based materials.” Id. (statement of Rep. Al McCandless).  
 18. See Behnam Dayanim & Kevin P. Broughel, The Video Privacy 
Protection Act - Recent Decisions Further Narrow The Contours Of Liability, PAUL 
HASTINGS (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-
items/details/?id=d1f9e369-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded [https://perma.cc/76EY-
QZ6X] (describing the recent increase in claims of VPPA violations on platforms 
with digital and online content that had not been contemplated by the original 
legislation). 
 19. See id.; see also Major R. Ken Pippin, Consumer Privacy on the 
Internet: It’s “Surfer Beware”, 47 A.F. L. REV. 125, 153 (1999) (explaining that 
“application of the VPPA to on-line retailers that sell videotapes and videodiscs was 
not part of the original legislation because the Internet’s commercial viability had 
not yet evolved”). 
 20. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
258, 126 Stat. 2414, 2414. The 2012 amendments to the VPPA allowed for 
consumer consent to be obtained online. See id.  
 21. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 835 F.3d 993, 1003 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
 22. See Diener, supra note 9 (noting the FCC’s new regulations’ failure to 
regulate edge providers). 
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providers, thus filling an important part of the privacy protection 
gap.23 These hybrid entities are an emergent concern as more 
common carriers are creating their own media content or merging 
with video content providers, such as Time Warner’s attempts at 
merging with AT&T.24 Although the United States Department of 
Justice has brought a lawsuit to stop this specific merger because of 
antitrust issues, such a common-carrier-content-creating entity is of 
concern25 because the current state of the FTC’s and FCC’s 
regulatory powers would leave such a super-company untouchable.26 
However, the VPPA’s protections for consumers’ PII regulates all 
video content providers and could be a reliable tool to continue 
protecting consumers’ privacy.27 
An important issue with using the VPPA to protect consumer 
information is the conflicting opinions of the First Circuit and 
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the term subscriber.28 
Although courts have interpreted renter and purchaser to have 
unequivocal meanings,29 the term subscriber is not defined within the 
                                                 
 23. See Fung, supra note 2 (discussing the potential for unregulated action 
falling between the limitations of the FCC and the FTC). 
 24. Time Warner, a cable television company, merging with AT&T, a 
common carrier, could easily become a common carrier content provider. See 
Cecilia Kang & Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T’s Blockbuster Deal for Time 
Warner Hangs in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/technology/att-time-warner-
merger.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/6BJX-N4U8] (describing the pending offer 
between the companies).  
 25. See Cecilia Kang & Michael J. De La Merced, Justice Department Sues 
To Block AT&T-Time Warner Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/business/dealbook/att-time-warner-
merger.html [https://nyti.ms/2hP3Y1z]. As of April 23, 2018, the case was pending 
before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the merger deadline 
is June 21, 2018. See Hadas Gold, Beyond Yes or No: Judge Richard Leon’s Options 
in the AT&T Antitrust Case, CNN (Apr. 23, 2018), 
http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/23/media/att-time-warner-judge-richard-leon-
options/index.html [https://perma.cc/4533-2HX5].  
 26. See Fung, supra note 2 (describing common carriers’ subsidiaries and 
other facets of business as now out of the FTC’s reach); see also Diener, supra note 
9 (explaining how the FCC’s rules do not regulate edge providers).  
 27. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) 
(2012). 
 28. See Jimmy H. Koo, Free App User Is Subscriber Under Video Privacy 
Act, 84 U.S. L. WK. 38, 38 (2016). 
 29. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487 
(1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that a purchaser is a consumer providing money in 
exchange for ownership of the video material, and a renter is a consumer providing 
money in exchange for temporary retention of the video material). 
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Act, and courts have not come to a consensus on how to define it.30 
As a result, the First and Eleventh Circuits have disagreed as to 
whether downloading and using a free cell phone application (app)31 
that shares a user’s information with a third party qualifies the app’s 
user to be a subscriber under the VPPA.32  
Judiciaries have had difficulty distinguishing between a 
subscriber and a casual user,33 and many courts stress that a 
subscriber must have more involvement than casual consumption of 
video content.34 However, when a consumer provides something of 
value to the content provider, this evidences a commitment.35 This 
Note argues that an app user sharing PII with a video content 
provider is yielding consideration to form a contract between the 
parties and is thus elevating the user’s relationship with the content 
provider to that of a subscriber.36  
Primarily, this Note provides a definition for subscriber, an 
otherwise undefined term.37 Having a reliable, consistent meaning for 
                                                 
 30. See § 2710(a)(1) (defining consumer as “any renter, purchaser, or 
subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider” but not further 
defining renter, purchaser, or subscriber). 
 31. A cell phone application, or app, is “a software program you can 
download and access directly using your phone or another mobile device.” 
Consumer Information, Understanding Mobile Apps, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0018-understanding-mobile-apps 
[https://perma.cc/TR92-N2YC] (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
 32. See Koo, supra note 27, at 38 (reviewing the conflicting holdings of the 
First and Eleventh Circuits).  
 33. See id. (comparing the holdings from the First and Eleventh Circuit on 
this issue); see also Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1316 
(N.D. Ga. 2015) (determining that the plaintiff viewing video content on a channel 
she downloaded onto her media streaming device qualified her to be a subscriber 
under the VPPA). 
 34. See, e.g., Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (describing how within the VPPA, 
being a subscriber signifies a heightened relationship between the consumer and 
video content provider); see also Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 
98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting “casual consumption” of online 
media is not enough to make a user a subscriber). 
 35. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (describing how the plaintiff downloading 
the app to his phone and the video content provider acquiring the plaintiff’s personal 
information exemplified a level of commitment between the parties).  
 36. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, the Hacker Way, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2013) (stating that “data privacy should be analyzed in the context of an 
exchange of two services that are each a ‘thing of value’: access to identity 
information in exchange for access to information services”). 
 37. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) 
(2012) (defining consumer as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or 
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a key term of the VPPA will make it more useful in protecting 
consumer privacy when facing today’s privacy gaps.38 This solution 
ensures the VPPA protects PII39 in a world where consumer data is a 
highly sought after commodity,40 and it gives effect to the legislators’ 
intent for the VPPA—to protect consumers’ PII.41 Further, this 
solution aligns with many courts’ assertions that the VPPA should 
only protect heightened consumer–provider relationships,42 addresses 
the value of PII,43 and makes the term subscriber exceptionally 
applicable in a technology-reliant world.44  
Part I discusses the history of the Video Privacy Protection Act 
of 1988, the Act’s definitions of pertinent terms, and the 2012 
amendments to the Act.45 Part II examines the cases from the First 
and Eleventh Circuits and assesses how each court analyzed whether 
downloading a free app made the user a subscriber under the 
                                                                                                       
services from a video tape service provider” but not further defining renter, 
purchaser, or subscriber). 
 38. See Fung, supra note 2 (noting the possibility for actions to fall between 
the FTC’s and FCC’s jurisdiction). 
 39. See Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, 
and Tagging of Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
553, 574 (2008) (explaining that PII collections are “highly sought after on the open 
market”). 
 40. See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A 
Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 71-72 
(2003) (describing the high value of consumer data).  
 41. See Matwyshyn, supra note 35, at 8 (supporting the theory of consumer 
information having sufficient value to qualify as contractual consideration and thus 
being able to form a contractual relationship between consumers and service 
providers). 
 42. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 489 
(1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that, within the VPPA, the subscriber status is recognized 
as a heightened relationship between the consumer and video content provider); see 
also Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (emphasizing “casual consumption” of online media is not enough 
to create a subscriber relationship). 
 43. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1882 
(2011) (discussing the value of identifiable information, particularly in the current 
age of information exchange).   
 44. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001) (explaining 
how society relies on technology for most encounters).   
 45. See infra Part I (explaining how the idea for the VPPA was sparked by 
the public exposure of the rental history of Judge Bork—a judge within the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit—in a newspaper and 
that the purpose of the Act is to protect the privacy of individuals). 
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VPPA.46 Part III reviews the rise in collection of consumer 
information for marketing purposes and explains why consumer 
information has become such a valuable commodity. Part IV 
analyzes which consumers of video content should be considered 
subscribers and provides an explanation as to why.47 
I. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
The Video Privacy Protection Act was enacted in 1988 to 
protect consumers’ personal privacy in transactions involving 
renting, buying, or subscribing to video content.48 At the time of the 
Act’s inception, video materials were generally acquired at physical 
video stores.49 However, video content distribution is no longer 
limited to in-person interactions,50 and in the years since 1988, many 
media exchanges have evolved to occur online.51 
A. History and Development of the Video Privacy Protection Act of 
1988 
Legislation that would become the VPPA was sparked by 
controversy related to then-Supreme-Court-Justice-nominee Judge 
Robert Bork.52 During the period when the Senate held hearings on 
his nomination, a newspaper in Washington, D.C. printed Judge 
                                                 
 46. See infra Part II (reviewing the analyses and holdings from the First 
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit).  
 47. See infra Part III (describing a new theory of an exchange of PII for 
video content creating a contractual relationship between the consumer and video 
content provider—qualifying the user as a subscriber).   
 48. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) 
(2012). The VPPA was created to “preserve personal privacy with respect to the 
rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials.” Id. 
 49. See Pippin, supra note 19, at 153. The Act was created to regulate video 
stores and rental businesses. Id. 
 50. See id. “The application of the VPPA to on-line retailers that sell 
videotapes and videodiscs was not part of the original legislation because the 
Internet’s commercial viability had not yet evolved.” Id.  
 51. See Rob Frieden, Internet Protocol Television and the Challenge of 
“Mission Critical” Bits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 48 (2015). Notably, 
“some video content consumers have ‘cut the cord’ and abandoned traditional video 
media options replacing them with online platforms.” Id.  
 52. Gregory M. Huffman, Video-Streaming Records and the Video Privacy 
Protection Act: Broadening the Scope of Personally Identifiable Information to 
Include Unique Device Identifiers Disclosed with Video Titles, 91 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 737, 743 (2016). The VPPA was created in reaction to the publishing of Judge 
Bork’s video rental history. See id.  
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Bork’s rental history from a local video store.53 Legislators were 
furious about this privacy violation.54 Shortly thereafter, 
Representative Al McCandless introduced a bill to the House that 
would later become the VPPA.55  
During the Joint Hearing on the VPPA, Representative 
McCandless emphasized the importance of individuals’ privacy in 
their media consumption.56 He explained that the disclosure of such 
habits was a privacy violation and that people have the right to enjoy 
media without government involvement.57 In its final form, the 
VPPA of 1988 prohibited video content providers from wrongfully 
disclosing the PII of purchasers, renters, and subscribers—
collectively labeled as consumers.58  
The facts of Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede provide a clear 
example of the type of individuals that legislators intended the VPPA 
to protect.59 In Dirkes, the investigation of a former police officer led 
to the discovery of pornographic material the officer and his wife 
rented from a local video store.60 The United States District Court for 
                                                 
 53. See id.  
 54. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the 
Misuse of Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 152-53 (2006) (describing 
how “[t]he media initially reacted to the list with light-hearted commentary on the 
Borks’ taste in movies,” which was immediately followed by an uproar of 
legislators’ frustration with such an invasion of privacy). 
 55. See H.R. 3523, 100th Cong. (1987). Representative Al McCandless 
introduced House Bill 3523, which would later become the VPPA, “to preserve 
personal privacy with respect to the rental or purchase of video tapes by individuals” 
shortly after. Id.  
 56. See Video and Library Privacy Protection Act of 1988, supra note 17, at 
27. Representative McCandless stated, “It is really nobody else’s business what 
people read, watch, or listen to.” Id.  
 57. See id. Representative McCandless explained that “[a]t the heart of this 
legislation is the notion that all citizens have a right to privacy—the right to be left 
alone—from their Government and from their neighbor.” Id. 
 58. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) 
(2012). The VPPA prevented the “[w]rongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale 
records.” Id. The Act also stated that PII can only be disclosed to the consumer 
himself, to someone who has the consumer’s consent, or to a law enforcement 
officer pursuant to a warrant. See id.   
 59. See Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede, 936 F. Supp. 235, 236 (D.N.J. 
1996); see also § 2710 (stating that the VPPA was created “to preserve personal 
privacy with respect to the rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar 
audio visual materials”). 
 60. Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 236. The court reviewed that “Lt. Busko 
obtained the names and rental dates of certain pornographic videotapes previously 
rented by Plaintiff Dirkes and his wife. . . . Busko received this information from an 
employee of Videos To Go,” a store plaintiffs regularly visited. Id.  
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the District of New Jersey found two separate VPPA violations 
within this encounter.61 First, by disclosing the officer’s rental history 
to the investigator, the video store violated the Act.62 A second 
violation occurred when the officer’s PII was received into evidence 
at his disciplinary hearing.63 The facts of this case portray the 
concerns of privacy violations in 1988 that the legislators 
contemplated when creating the VPPA.64  
B. The Act Today 
Although the Video Privacy Protection Act was originally 
enacted 1988,65 it has evolved in its applicability.66 Amendments to 
the Act were introduced in 2012 so consumers could provide 
electronic consent for video content providers to disclose their PII.67 
This amendment allowed the VPPA to reflect the new landscape of 
video consumption occurring online in consumers’ homes, while still 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 239 (explaining that the VPPA can be violated in three different 
ways and the defendant violated the Act in two of the ways).   
 62. See id. at 239-40. The court explained in Dirkes:  
Videos to Go, the video tape service provider in this matter, violated 
subsection (b) of the Act by disclosing Plaintiffs’ video rental 
information to Lt. Busko. It is undisputed that this disclosure does not 
fall into one of the six permissible disclosure exceptions delineated in 
subsection (b)(2) of the Act. 
Id.  
 63. See id. at 240 (explaining that the “second violation of the Act occurred 
when Plaintiffs’ personally identifiable information was received into evidence at 
Plaintiff Dirkes’ disciplinary hearing”). 
 64. See § 2710(a)(1); see also Dirkes, 936 F. Supp. at 236 (reviewing 
claims of VPPA violations involving a brick-and-mortar video store disclosing the 
names and video rentals of individuals, a situation that the Act clearly 
contemplated). 
 65. See § 2710 (indicating an enactment date of 1988). 
 66. Harv. L. Rev., Recent Case, Statutory Interpretation – The Video 
Privacy Protection Act – Eleventh Circuit Limits the Scope of “Subscriber” for 
VPPA Protections. – Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 
2015)., 129 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2011 (2016) [hereinafter Recent Case] (explaining 
how “[t]he VPPA, originally aimed at traditional brick-and-mortar video rental 
stores such as Blockbuster, has seen a newfound applicability in the modern era of 
streaming video and ‘big data’ analytics”). This includes cases involving cell phone 
app downloads. Id. See, e.g., Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1252 
(11th Cir. 2015) (reviewing the download of a free mobile app). 
 67. See Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414, 2414. The amendment was created “to clarify that a 
video tape service provider may obtain a consumer’s informed, written consent on 
an ongoing basis and that consent may be obtained through the Internet.” Id. 
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providing the same necessary protections for consumers’ privacy.68 
During the amendment’s hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Privacy, Technology, and the Law, Senator Patrick Leahy 
emphasized the importance of balancing innovation and protecting 
individual privacy.69 Additionally, in his opening statement, Senator 
Al Franken focused on the importance of bringing the VPPA into the 
world of current advanced technology to ensure its applicability for 
claims involving Internet and cell phone use.70 With this amendment, 
the Act could more easily be used to protect consumers’ privacy as 
they accessed video content with new technology.71  
Today, the terms of the VPPA are clearly applicable to a 
variety of video-content providers.72 The Act no longer simply 
regulates “brick-and-mortar” video stores as it has been expanded to 
apply to video-content providers accessed online and on cell 
phones.73 Importantly, however, the VPPA’s amendment did not 
provide any definitions for the Act’s originally undefined terms.74 
                                                 
 68. See 158 CONG. REC. H6850 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2012) (statement of Rep. 
Bob Goodlatte) (explaining that the amendment “is narrowly crafted to preserve the 
VPPA’s protections for consumers’ privacy, while modernizing the law to empower 
consumers to do more with their video consumption preferences,” such as sharing 
content on social media or downloading content from Internet-based services).  
 69. See The Video Privacy Protection Act: Protecting Viewer Privacy in the 
21st Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and the Law of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 28-29 (2012) [hereinafter Protecting 
Viewer Privacy]. Senator Leahy explained that when “updating our Federal laws, we 
must carefully balance the need to promote American innovation and the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement, while ensuring that we protect personal privacy.” Id. 
 70. See id. at 3 (quoting Senator Al Franken) (explaining that “if we are 
updating the Video Privacy Protection Act, I think we need to confirm that it covers 
video streaming technology”). 
 71. See 158 CONG. REC. H6850 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte). 
Representative Goodlatte explained that due to “today’s technology, consumers can 
quickly and efficiently access video programming through a variety of platforms, 
including through Internet protocol-based video services, all without leaving their 
homes . . . . It’s time that Congress updates the VPPA to keep up with today’s 
technology and the consumer marketplace.” Id.   
 72. See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (explaining that Hulu, an Internet-based television and movie provider, is a 
video tape service provider under the VPPA); see also Robinson v. Disney Online, 
152 F. Supp. 3d 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (determining if Disney Online, as a video 
service provider, disclosed a user’s PII). 
 73. See Recent Case, supra note 65, at 2011. 
 74. See Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414, 2414 (providing the amendment to the VPPA allowing 
for consent to be provided electronically).  
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C. Terms and Meaning Within the Act 
Courts must use principles of statutory interpretation in many 
VPPA claims because application of the Act often requires the 
judiciary to make assessments using the Act’s undefined terms.75 
Courts begin statutory interpretation and application with a review of 
the language found in the statute.76 When a statute does not contain 
definitions of important terms or if the language is unclear, courts 
often review other judiciaries’ definitions and analyses.77 
Assessments of VPPA claims have been no exception to this 
process;78 courts hearing VPPA claims begin by looking to the Act 
itself,79 followed by a review of other courts’ assessments.80 
1. Definitions Within the Act  
The VPPA provides definitions for some of its key terms.81 The 
first of these terms is consumer; a consumer is defined as a “renter, 
                                                 
 75. See id. The VPPA leaves the terms personally identifiable information 
and subscriber undefined within the Act, and courts are left to their own statutory 
interpretation methods to craft definitions of these terms. See, e.g., In re 
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(determining the definition of PII under the VPPA); see also Locklear v. Dow Jones 
& Co., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (resolving a definition of 
subscriber under the VPPA in order to rule on a claim of VPPA violation).  
 76. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) 
(describing “[t]he task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [the statute] 
begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute”). 
 77. See, e.g., In re Hulu, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 (reviewing how the 
Seventh Circuit discussed personal information in Senne v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 
695 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 283 
(discussing how the court defined PII in Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information 
Network, 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016)). 
 78. See Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 
662, 668-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (reviewing the plain language of the statute, dictionary 
definitions of the terms within the statute, and then how two recent cases have 
discussed the meaning of the term subscriber). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 112916, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (reviewing the plain language 
of the statute followed by a review of dictionary definitions). 
 80. See Austin-Spearman, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 669-70 (reviewing how two 
federal district courts defined the term subscriber); see also Robinson v. Disney 
Online, 152 F. Supp. 3d 176, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing four recent cases 
concerning various information collected and determining if it was PII under the 
VPPA). 
 81. See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) 
(2012).    
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purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape 
service provider.”82 However, the term subscriber is not further 
defined within the Act.83 Second, personally identifiable information 
(PII) is a collection of data that “identifies a person as having 
requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a 
video tape service provider.”84 Finally, a video tape service provider 
is someone in the business of selling, renting, or providing video 
content.85 
The VPPA provides further information for what disclosures 
are considered wrongful under the Act.86 For example, a video tape 
service provider violates the Act if there is a knowing disclosure of 
the identity of the consumer, the identity of the video content they 
used, and information linking the content to the consumer.87 
Consumer information alone, without the information connecting the 
consumer to the video materials watched, is not enough.88 
2. Definitions from Case Law  
Since the VPPA was enacted in 1988, courts in the United 
States have grappled with applying its terms.89 Even when a term has 
                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. (indicating that subscriber is listed within the definition of 
consumer but not further discussed within the Act).  
 84. Id. PII’s definition “includes” such identifiable information, which 
indicates that it is not limited to only including such information. See id. 
 85. See id. The Act defines video tape service provider as a person that is 
“engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, 
sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual 
materials.” Id. See also Recent Case, supra note 65, at 2011 (describing how the 
VPPA originally aimed to regulate traditional video stores, and it now protects 
consumers from online video content providers).  
 86. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a), (b) 
(2012). While section (a) of the Act includes definitions, section (b) explains what 
constitutes a violation of the Act. See id. 
 87. See id. § 2710(b)(1); see also In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 86 F. Supp. 3d 
1090, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining how a video service provider violates the 
Act when it discloses the identity of the consumer and his or her viewing history).  
 88. See § 2710(a)(3). The Act specifically states that the provider cannot 
disclose information that “identifies a person as having requested or obtained 
specific video materials.” Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Robinson v. Disney Online, 152 F. Supp. 3d 176, 181-82 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discerning what the meaning of PII is under the VPPA, a term that 
is defined but has proven to be not always easily applicable); see also Austin-
Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 668-71 (S.D.N.Y. 
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been defined by the Act, it is not always clear how a court should 
apply the definition in each unique case.90 For terms that are not 
defined in the Act, courts must determine to whom and to what the 
terms apply.91 
a. How Courts Have Defined Personally Identifiable 
Information 
Liability under the VPPA exists if a video content provider 
discloses PII without the consumer’s consent.92 Assessing whether 
PII is involved is one of the most important steps in determining if 
there is a privacy violation.93 Although the Act defines PII, courts 
struggle with what information can actually identify an individual.94 
Courts have proposed different strategies for discerning what 
comprises PII and what does not.95 
                                                                                                       
2015) (discussing what constitutes a subscriber under the VPPA, a term that the Act 
does not define). 
 90. See Robinson, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 180 (explaining that although the Act 
defines PII, the court still needed to determine whether information actually 
identified the plaintiff). The court described how “[l]ess clear is the scope of 
information encompassed by PII, and how, precisely, this information must identify 
a person.” Id. 
 91. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487 
(1st Cir. 2016) (reviewing the plain meaning and dictionary definitions of subscriber 
to determine the existence of VPPA violations). 
 92. See § 2710(b)(2)(B). 
 93. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1814. Further, “PII is one of 
the most central concepts in privacy regulation. It defines the scope and boundaries 
of a large range of privacy statutes and regulations. Numerous federal statutes turn 
on this distinction.” Id. at 1816.  
 94. See id. at 1829 (defining PII data as “information which identifies a 
person. For purposes of the statute, information that identifies a person is PII and 
falls under the statute’s jurisdiction once linked to the purchase, request, or 
obtaining of video material”); see also In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 86 F. Supp. 3d 
1090, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (attempting to determine if particular information 
identifies the consumers). 
 95. See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 
267 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the VPPA’s “prohibition on the disclosure of 
personally identifiable information applies only to the kind of information that 
would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual’s video-
watching behavior . . . [disclosures] involving digital identifiers like IP addresses, 
fall outside the Act’s protections”); see also In re Hulu, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 1096 
(holding that because the consumer’s identity was sent separately from his video 
viewing history, the video content provider, Hulu, “did not disclose information that 
‘identifie[d] a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials’”). 
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In 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit endeavored to further define the parameters of PII.96 A class 
action was brought on the behalf of children against Viacom, a video 
service provider; the action claimed that Viacom placed a cookie—a 
file that tracks a user’s Internet browsing history—on the children’s 
computers.97 These cookies were placed to collect the children’s 
online identifiers and data revealing what videos they watched 
online, and Viacom then shared this data with Google.98 Plaintiffs 
claimed that the information collected was sufficient to identify the 
children, thus qualifying as PII, and its subsequent disclosure 
violated the VPPA.99 While the court believed the definition of PII 
was unclear,100 it determined that the data in question was not PII 
because, on its face, it could not identify a particular person along 
with his or her video consumption.101 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ 
arguments, the court held that the data could not be PII because it 
needed to be assembled in a particular way to actually identify the 
plaintiffs.102 
In 2015, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California took on a similar issue in In re Hulu Privacy 
                                                 
 96. See In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 267. 
 97. See id. at 268. The court discusses that “[a]n Internet ‘cookie’ is a small 
text file that a web server places on a user’s computing device. Cookies allow a 
website to ‘remember’ information about a user’s browsing activities (such as 
whether or not the user is logged-in, or what specific pages the user has visited).” Id.  
 98. Id. at 267 (describing that “[t]he plaintiffs are children younger than 
[thirteen] who allege that the defendants, Viacom and Google, unlawfully collected 
personal information about them on the Internet, including what webpages they 
visited and what videos they watched on Viacom’s websites”). Viacom had also 
contracted with Google to display advertisements on Viacom’s websites, so Google 
could place its own cookies on users’ computers to track their online activities. See 
id. at 269. 
 99. See id. at 270 (explaining how plaintiffs believed “it is surprisingly easy 
for advertising companies to identify web users’ offline identities based on their 
online browsing habits”).  
 100. See id. at 284 (noting that “the proper meaning of the phrase ‘personally 
identifiable information’ is not straightforward”). 
 101. See id. at 290. The court found that PII is only “the kind of information 
that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual’s 
video-watching behavior.” Id.  
 102. See id. (specifying that “[t]he allegation that Google will assemble 
otherwise anonymous pieces of data to unmask the identity of individual children is, 
at least with respect to the kind of identifiers at issue here, simply too hypothetical to 
support liability under the Video Privacy Protection Act”). 
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Litigation.103 These plaintiffs were users of Hulu, a video content 
website.104 Hulu tracked users’ information with cookies that were 
connected to a user’s Facebook profile.105 However, viewers’ 
identifiers were disclosed separately from their viewing history.106 
Ultimately, the court held that because the identifying information 
was transmitted separately from their video use information, the 
information was not PII.107 Thus, even terms defined in the VPPA 
often require courts to discern their applicability in each VPPA 
case.108 
b. How Subscriber Has Been Defined  
A second term from the VPPA that courts have strived to 
define is the statutorily undefined term subscriber.109 In 2015, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
attempted to define subscriber while reviewing a user’s download of 
the Wall Street Journal Live Channel onto her Roku media streaming 
                                                 
 103. See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (assessing if the information Hulu disclosed constituted PII). 
 104. See id. at 1091 (explaining that plaintiffs “allege that Hulu wrongfully 
disclosed their video viewing selections and personal-identification information to a 
third party”). 
 105. See id. at 1093-94. The plaintiffs’ expert believed “that this 
transmission enabled Facebook to link information identifying the user and the 
user’s video choices to other information about the particular user.” Id. at 1094. 
 106. See id. at 1096. Thus:  
[E]ven if both elements were sent to Facebook, they did not necessarily 
disclose a user “as having requested or obtained specific video materials” 
unless Facebook combined the two pieces of information. Without 
Facebook forging that connection there is no “disclosure” of “personally 
identifiable information” under the terms of the VPPA. 
Id. 
 107. See id. at 1097 (explaining how the Act “requires proof that three things 
were disclosed: a consumer’s identity; the identity of ‘specific video materials’; and 
a connection between the two — that is, that the consumer ‘requested or obtained’ 
those videos”).  
 108. See, e.g., id. (determining if the information constituted PII); see also In 
re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(reviewing if disclosed information was PII).  
 109. See Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1316 (N.D. 
Ga. 2015) (reviewing if consumers qualified as subscribers under the VPPA); see 
also Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 668-71 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (determining which consumers constitute subscribers under the 
VPPA); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112916, at *22-24 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (assessing which consumers constitute 
subscribers under the VPPA). 
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device.110 The court decided to label the plaintiff as a subscriber 
because she downloaded the Wall Street Journal Channel and her 
Roku’s serial number along with the media she streamed was sent to 
an analytics and advertising company;111 these connections 
established her elevated subscriber status.112 The District Court held 
that an exchange of money is not necessary for a user of an app to be 
a subscriber.113 Similarly, when the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California reviewed what subscriber means, 
it emphasized that the terms renter and buyer imply an exchange of 
money but that the word subscriber does not have the same effect.114 
In 2015, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York also addressed who is a subscriber.115 In Austin-
Spearman v. AMC Network Entertainment LLC, the plaintiff used 
AMC Network Entertainment’s website to watch a television show; 
however, the court determined that she was not a subscriber.116 The 
court concluded that to be a subscriber under the VPPA, the 
individual must do more than use the video provider’s service 
                                                 
 110. See Locklear, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 1313, 1315-16. The court explained 
“Roku is a digital media-streaming device that delivers videos, news, games, and 
other content to consumers’ televisions via the Internet.” Id. at 1313. 
 111. See id. at 1316. When Plaintiff used her Roku, Dow Jones sent her 
serial number and what video content she watched to an analytics and advertising 
company, mDialog. See id. at 1314. The Court further stated:  
[O]nce equipped with the demographic data linked to a Roku serial 
number, mDialog, by receiving information from such other entities, can 
attribute video records received from Dow Jones to an actual individual. 
mDialog was able to identify Plaintiff and attribute her video records to an 
individualized profile in its databases.  
Id. 
 112. Id. at 1316 (“Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts that qualify her as a 
‘subscriber,’ and therefore a ‘consumer.’ She alleges that she downloaded the WSJ 
Channel and used it to watch video clips, and her [Roku] serial number and viewing 
history were transmitted to mDialog. These assertions suffice . . . .”). 
 113. See id. at 1315-16 (explaining that the VPPA does not define subscriber 
and asserting that “if a plaintiff, in addition to visiting a website, pleads that he or 
she also viewed video content on that website, that plaintiff is a ‘subscriber’ to a 
service within the meaning of the VPPA”). 
 114. In re Hulu, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112916, at *23-24 (“[W]hile the 
terms ‘renter’ and ‘buyer’ necessarily imply payment of money, the term 
‘subscriber’ does not. Hulu cites no authority suggesting any different result. If 
Congress wanted to limit the word ‘subscriber’ to ‘paid subscriber,’ it would have 
said so.”). 
 115. See Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 
662, 668-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 116. See id. at 670. 
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regardless of whether the provider collects a user’s information.117 
This analysis emphasized how “casual consumption” and a lack of 
connection between the user and the content provider is not enough 
to produce a subscriber status.118 
Throughout the technological advancements in the years since 
the VPPA was originally implemented, courts have endeavored to 
balance using the VPPA to protect consumers119 while working to 
only apply it in situations that seem appropriate.120 Problematically, 
courts wrestle with the parameters of who and what fits within the 
VPPA’s protections on a case-by-case basis until more precise 
definitions are laid out.121 The transition in how video content is 
acquired—from renting VHS tapes from a local video store to a 
finger tap download onto a smartphone—has dramatically changed 
how a subscriber is understood.122 
                                                 
 117. See id. at 671 (holding that “an individual must do more than simply 
take advantage of a provided service—even if doing so alone allows a provider to 
access her information—in order to have acted as a ‘subscriber’ of the provider”). 
 118. See id. at 669 (describing how “[s]uch casual consumption of web 
content, without any attempt to affiliate with or connect to the provider, exhibits 
none of the critical characteristics of ‘subscription’”). 
 119. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012) 
(stating that the Act was created “to preserve personal privacy with respect to the 
rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials”); see 
also Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(explaining how the amendments to the VPPA “allowed consumers greater 
flexibility to share their video viewing preferences, while maintaining their 
privacy”). 
 120. See, e.g., Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1254-55 (determining that plaintiff’s 
information did not constitute PII because, without additional information, it could 
not connect the plaintiff to the video content he viewed); Austin-Spearman, 98 F. 
Supp. 3d at 669 (determining that “casual consumption” of video content was not of 
a relationship between an individual who visited a video content provider’s website 
to hold the provider liable under the VPPA). 
 121. See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 
267 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding PII must be information directly linking an 
individual to the video content he or she acquired); Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co., 
101 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that plaintiff viewing video 
content on a channel she downloaded onto her media streaming device qualified her 
to be a subscriber under the VPPA). 
 122. See Recent Case, supra note 65, at 2011 (explaining that who a 
subscriber is under the VPPA involves a review of actions such as downloading 
apps, logging in, and engaging online in ways that did not exist when the Act was 
created). 
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II. IN THIS NEW ERA, WHO ARE SUBSCRIBERS? 
Today’s technology creates many instances that require courts 
to determine if a consumer constitutes a “subscriber” under the 
VPPA.123 Recently, the First and Eleventh Circuits have addressed 
whether users of free cell phone apps can be considered subscribers 
under the Act.124 In Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Information 
Network, the First Circuit determined that the use of a free app user 
qualified as a subscriber,125 while in Ellis v. Cartoon Network, the 
Eleventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion.126 
A. How the First Circuit Determined a User of a Free App Was a 
Subscriber 
In April of 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit heard Alexander Yershov’s claim that Gannett Satellite 
Information Network (Gannett) violated the VPPA.127 Yershov 
appealed the district court’s grant of Gannett’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint; the district court concluded that Gannett’s release of 
Yershov’s PII did not violate the VPPA because Yershov was not a 
consumer under the Act’s definition, and thus he was not 
protected.128 Yershov’s relationship with Gannett, an international 
media company, began when he downloaded the USA Today Mail 
App on his cell phone—a cell phone app that Gannett provides 
content for, including videos.129  
                                                 
 123. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 484 
(1st Cir. 2016) (determining whether downloading and using a free cellphone app 
gave the consumer subscriber status); Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1257 (determining whether 
the downloader of a free app can be considered a subscriber under the VPPA); 
Austin-Spearman, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 668-69 (determining whether watching a 
television show online indicated the viewer was a subscriber). 
 124. See Koo, supra note 27, at 38 (reviewing the conflicting holdings of the 
First and Eleventh Circuits); Yershov, 820 F.3d at 484; Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1252. 
 125. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487. 
 126. See Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1252. 
 127. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 484. 
 128. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C § 2710(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012)) (reviewing how 
“the district court found that the information Gannett disclosed concerning Yershov 
was ‘personally identifiable information’ (‘PII’) under the VPPA, 18 U.S.C. § 
2710(a)(3), but that Yershov was not a ‘renter, purchaser, or subscriber’ of or to 
Gannett’s video content and, therefore, not a ‘consumer’ protected by the Act”). 
 129. See id. 
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The court reviewed what occurred once Yershov downloaded 
the free USA Today Mail App.130 Once downloaded onto a user’s 
phone, the app collects the user’s GPS coordinates, identification 
information about the user’s cell phone, and the title of each video 
watched.131 The collected data is sent to a third party, Adobe, for 
consumer behavior analysis and marketing strategies.132 Accordingly, 
Adobe collected Yershov’s data every time he watched a video clip133 
and was able to identify Yershov using these three forms of 
information.134 
The First Circuit made two preliminary determinations to 
discern whether Gannett violated the VPPA.135 First, it held that the 
information Yershov provided was PII because it could easily 
identify him.136 Although each piece of data could not identify 
Yershov on its own, the court concluded that, collectively, it was still 
PII because Gannett disclosed it to Adobe knowing Adobe had the 
                                                 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. (explaining how “each time the user views a video clip on the 
App, Gannett sends to Adobe . . . (1) the title of the video viewed, (2) the GPS 
coordinates of the device at the time the video was viewed, and (3) certain 
identifiers associated with the user’s device”). 
 132. See id. at 484-85. The Court in Yershov indicated: 
Adobe is an unrelated third party that offers data analytics and online 
marketing services to its clients by collecting information about consumers 
and their online behavior. A unique identifier such as an Android ID 
allows Adobe “to identify and track specific users across multiple 
electronic devices, applications, and services” that a consumer may use. 
Adobe takes this and other information culled from a variety of sources to 
create user profiles comprised of a given user’s personal information, 
online behavioral data, and device identifiers. The information contained 
in these profiles may include, for example, the user’s name and address, 
age and income, “household structure,” and online navigation and 
transaction history.  
Id. This compiled information was then used to create targeted advertisements for 
Adobe’s clients, including Gannett. See id. at 485. 
 133. See id. (explaining the collection and disclosure of Yershov’s personal 
information). 
 134. See id. (describing how by “[u]sing this information, Adobe was able to 
identify Yershov and link the videos he had viewed to his individualized profile 
maintained by Adobe”). 
 135. See id. at 486-89 (determining whether the information collected was 
PII and if Yershov was a subscriber).  
 136. See id. at 486 (noting that while the term PII is ambiguous, “the 
language reasonably conveys the point that PII is not limited to information that 
explicitly names a person. Had Congress intended such a narrow and simple 
construction, it would have had no reason to fashion the more abstract formulation 
contained in the statute”). 
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ability to combine the content and identify which users watched 
which videos.137 Second, the court concluded that Yershov was a 
subscriber.138  
To determine that Yershov was a subscriber, the court needed a 
definition of subscriber to use.139 While acknowledging many 
potential definitions of subscriber,140 the court concluded that 
definitions requiring payment were incorrect because they would 
render the terms renter and purchaser superfluous.141 The First 
Circuit reviewed definitions of subscribe and subscriber from 
multiple dictionaries, and the court accepted a definition of subscribe 
as an agreement to have access to content.142 The court believed that 
in downloading the app and providing his valuable personal 
information, Yershov made a commitment to Gannett in a way that 
made him a subscriber.143 This holding was an important step in 
                                                 
 137. See id. (explaining that once Adobe had all of the information Gannett 
provided, it was relatively easy for Adobe to combine the information in a way that 
would clearly identify Yershov).  
 138. See id. at 487.  
 139. See id. (reviewing definitions of subscriber to determine which 
definition to apply). 
 140. See id. (noting that “there are other common definitions of the term 
‘subscribe’ that include as an element a payment of some type and/or presume more 
than a one-shot transaction”). 
 141. See id. (explaining how “if the term ‘subscriber’ required some sort of 
monetary payment, it would be rendered superfluous by the two terms preceding 
it”); see also Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2012). 
 142. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY 1726 (4th ed. 2000)) (discussing definitions of subscriber). The court 
cited that this dictionary defined subscribe as “to receive or be allowed to access 
electronic texts or services by subscription” and defined subscription as “an 
agreement to receive or be given access to electronic texts or services.” Id. The court 
ultimately stated that these definitions reflected Yershov’s exact situation because 
“Gannett offered and Yershov accepted Gannett’s proprietary mobile device 
application as a tool for directly receiving access to Gannett’s electronic text and 
videos without going through other distribution channels.” Id. Interestingly, the 
court pointed out that this relationship was “much like how a newspaper subscriber 
in 1988 could, if he wished, retrieve a copy of the paper in a box at the end of his 
driveway without having to go look for it at a store.” Id. 
 143. See id. at 489 (explaining that Yershov’s “access was not free of a 
commitment to provide consideration in the form of that information, which was of 
value to Gannett. And by installing the App on his phone, thereby establishing 
seamless access to an electronic version of USA Today, Yershov established a 
relationship with Gannett”). 
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defining the term subscriber,144 as other courts’ analyses have not 
resulted in the same conclusion.145 
B. How the Eleventh Circuit Determined a User of a Free App Was 
Not a Subscriber 
In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether Mark Ellis, a 
user of a free cell phone app, was a subscriber under the VPPA.146 
Ellis downloaded the Cartoon Network’s free “CN app” to watch 
television shows and video clips on his Android cell phone.147 
Downloading the CN app allows users to watch free videos or log in 
with television provider information for more content.148 Regardless 
of whether the user logs in or not, the CN app will identify and track 
Android smartphone users through an identifier that is generated for 
each cell phone.149 This unique identifier remains consistent on the 
device for various apps and services on the phone.150  
Without his consent, Cartoon Network collected Ellis’s 
identifier and viewing history and disclosed it to a third-party 
analytics company, Bango, each time he closed the app.151 Bango 
utilizes a user’s Android ID to account for each user’s activity on 
                                                 
 144. See id. (using disclosure of personal information to signify a 
commitment between a consumer and video content provider, thus creating a 
subscriber relationship between the two). 
 145. See, e.g., Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1252 (11th Cir. 
2015) (holding that a user providing personal information to video content provider 
to use a free app was not a subscriber under the VPPA). 
 146. See id. at 1252. 
 147. See id. at 1253-54 (describing how “Cartoon Network provides a free 
mobile application (‘app’ for short) for smartphones called the CN app. Persons can 
download the app to watch clips or episodes of TV shows on Cartoon Network”). 
 148. See id. at 1253 (explaining that users of the app can freely view content 
without creating an account or can supply information to login with their television 
provider details). 
 149. See id. at 1254 (describing that “Cartoon Network identifies and tracks 
an Android smartphone user on the CN app through his mobile device identification 
or Android ID, which is ‘a 64-bit number (hex string) that is randomly generated 
when a user initially sets up his device and should remain constant’” for the life of 
the device). 
 150. See id. (explaining how the ID is used to log actions on the device, 
including tracking CN app activity). 
 151. See id. (describing how “[t]he CN app does not ask users for their 
consent to share or otherwise disclose personally identifiable information to third 
parties”). 
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multiple electronic devices and from various content providers.152 By 
composing and connecting the data it receives about users, Bango 
can link Android IDs to specific individuals along with their viewing 
history.153 As such, Bango used Ellis’s ID to identify him and 
connect it with his viewing history on the app.154 However, the 
district court concluded that this information was not PII because, 
without being combined with other data, it could not identify Ellis.155  
The Eleventh Circuit held that, by itself, the act of downloading 
and using a free app does not make the user a subscriber.156 While 
payment is one of the factors to consider when determining if a user 
is a subscriber, it is not the only element to look for when making 
this determination.157 The court emphasized that the subscriber 
relationship requires an elevated commitment158 and noted that there 
is not much inherent commitment in downloading an app that can be 
deleted at any time.159 Because Ellis did not sign up for an account, 
disclose any personal information, or make payments, the court 
                                                 
 152. See id. (describing how Bango collects information about Android users 
and combines it in a way that they can track their actions).  
 153. See id. The court explained how Bango will 
“automatically” link an Android ID to a particular person by compiling 
information about that individual from other websites, applications, and 
sources. So when Cartoon Network sends Bango the Android ID of a CN 
app user along with his video viewing history, Bango associates that video 
history with a particular individual. 
Id. 
 154. See id. Although Cartoon Network did not give Bango Ellis’s name, 
Cartoon Network provided a “combination of Mr. Ellis’[s] Android ID and video 
viewing records. Because Bango is able to identify Mr. Ellis from his Android ID, it 
knows which videos he watched.” Id.  
 155. See id. The district court held that this information was not PII because, 
on its own, it could not connect an individual to a viewing history. See id. at 1255.  
 156. See id. at 1252 (determining that “a person who downloads and uses a 
free mobile application on his smartphone to view freely available content, without 
more, is not a ‘subscriber’ (and therefore not a ‘consumer’) under the VPPA”). 
 157. See id. at 1257 (clarifying that “downloading an app for free and using 
it to view content at no cost is not enough to make a user of the app a ‘subscriber’ 
under the VPPA, as there is no ongoing commitment or relationship between the 
user and the entity which owns and operates the app”). 
 158. See id. at 1256 (explaining how a “‘subscription’ involves some type of 
commitment, relationship, or association (financial or otherwise) between a person 
and an entity”).  
 159. See id. at 1257 (explaining that a user who simply downloads an app “is 
free to delete the app without consequences whenever he likes, and never access its 
content again”). 
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concluded that he was not a subscriber under the VPPA.160 It can be 
inferred from this conclusion that had Ellis met any of those three 
criteria, he would have been considered a subscriber under the 
VPPA,161 and if so, the First and Eleventh Circuit’s analysis may 
have produced more similar conclusions.162 
C. Distinguishing the Two Circuits’ Holdings  
While the analyses of the First and Eleventh Circuits may 
initially appear similar,163 there is a stark contrast between the two 
courts’ ultimate conclusions.164 The most important difference 
between the two analyses is how the courts viewed the disclosed 
information.165 The First Circuit explained that the disclosed 
information was PII; even though Yershov could not be identified by 
the information on its face, it was PII because Gannet was able to 
identify Yershov by combining the information.166 Providing this 
valuable personal information was also an element that persuaded the 
                                                 
 160. See id. (noting that Ellis did not make a meaningful connection with 
CN; rather, he just viewed content that was on a free app). The court believed that 
“downloading an app for free and using it to view content at no cost is not enough to 
make a user of the app a ‘subscriber’ under the VPPA, as there is no ongoing 
commitment or relationship between the user and the entity which owns and 
operates the app.” Id.  
 161. See id. Because the court lists particular forms of commitment that Mr. 
Ellis did not make, including that he did not provide “payments to Cartoon Network 
for use of the CN app[,] . . . become a registered user[,] . . . receive a Cartoon 
Network ID, . . . [create a] profile, . . . sign up for any periodic services or 
transmissions, . . . [or] make any commitment” to Cartoon Network, it appears the 
court would consider these forms of commitment signs of a possible subscriber. Id.  
 162. See infra Section II.C (comparing the First Circuit’s analysis in Yershov 
to the Eleventh Circuit’s in Ellis).  
 163. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487 
(11th Cir. 2016) (concluding that monetary payment is not necessary for a user to be 
a subscriber under the VPPA); Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1256 (same). 
 164. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 490 (concluding the plaintiff was a subscriber 
under the VPPA); Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1257 (concluding the plaintiff was not a 
subscriber under the VPPA). 
 165. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (determining that because Yershov 
disclosed his own personal information, this established a commitment between 
himself and the video content provider); Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1254, 1257 (determining 
that Ellis’s information provided was insufficient to create a commitment between 
himself and the video content provider).  
 166. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (explaining that once Adobe had all of the 
information Gannett provided, it was relatively easy for Adobe to combine the 
information in a way that would clearly identify Yershov). 
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court to hold that Yershov was a subscriber.167 Contrastingly, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that even though Bango could identify Ellis 
from the information Cartoon Network provided,168 the data was not 
PII.169 The court also held that Ellis displayed no forms of 
commitment to indicate that he should have been considered a 
subscriber under the VPPA.170  
It is possible that if the Eleventh Circuit found the information 
Ellis disclosed was more personal in nature—such as PII—the court 
would have determined his disclosure to be a commitment.171 In its 
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit lists actions Ellis did not take that may 
have exemplified a commitment between himself and Cartoon 
Network, such as making a payment or creating a profile on the 
app.172 Within the court’s list of absent commitment factors, the court 
specifically points out that Ellis provided no personal information.173 
Because the Eleventh Circuit found, among other factors, that Ellis’s 
lack of disclosure of personal information indicated a lack of 
commitment174—and thereby concluded Ellis was not a subscriber—
it is logical to conclude that, had the court determined that the 
                                                 
 167. See id. (discerning that “[w]hile he paid no money, access was not free 
of a commitment to provide consideration in the form of that information, which 
was of value to Gannett”). 
 168. See Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1254 (describing how “when Cartoon Network 
sends Bango the Android ID of a CN app user along with his video viewing history, 
Bango associates that video history with a particular individual”). 
 169. See id. at 1255. The district court determined that because the data 
provided could not identify Ellis on its own, it was not PII. See id.  
 170. See id. at 1252.  
 171. See id. 1257 (pointing out that no commitment was made by listing 
examples of absent actions that may have been an indication of commitment).  
 172. See id. The court explained that: 
Mr. Ellis did not sign up for or establish an account with Cartoon 
Network, did not provide any personal information to Cartoon Network, 
did not make any payments to Cartoon Network for use of the CN app, did 
not become a registered user of Cartoon Network or the CN app, did not 
receive a Cartoon Network ID, did not establish a Cartoon Network 
profile, did not sign up for any periodic services or transmissions, and did 
not make any commitment or establish any relationship. 
Id. The court found that Mr. Ellis’s lack of actions displaying commitment indicated 
that he did nothing more than download an app and thereby did not require 
protection under the VPPA. See id.  
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. (explaining how “downloading an app for free and using it to 
view content at no cost is not enough to make a user of the app a ‘subscriber’ under 
the VPPA, as there is no ongoing commitment or relationship between the user and 
the entity which owns and operates the app”). 
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information Ellis provided was PII, it would have impacted the 
court’s determination of whether he was a subscriber.175 
The First Circuit’s differing assessment on the value of 
consumer information as it relates to the user’s status under the 
VPPA is critical because changes in marketing trends have increased 
consumer information’s value.176 In the unique assessment in 
Yershov, the First Circuit recognized how profitable consumer 
information has become177 by noting that the disclosure of this 
information indicates a commitment.178 Although Bango could use 
Ellis’s information to identify him, the Eleventh Circuit did not 
conclude Ellis provided anything of value.179 To further bring the 
VPPA into the digital age180 and continue protecting consumers,181 it 
is necessary to recognize the value of personal information, the 
prevalence of consumer data markets, and the ease of collecting 
consumer information online.182  
                                                 
 175. See id. (determining that the absence of personal information disclosure 
to the content provider indicated a lack of commitment between consumer and video 
content provider). 
 176. See Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576 (explaining how valuable PII is 
because it is so useful to create effective direct marketing). 
 177. The court recognized that the information Yershov provided was 
valuable and understood that his personal information was provided for in exchange 
for the video content he received. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 
Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 489 (11th Cir. 2016); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576 
(explaining how valuable PII is today). 
 178. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (acknowledging that “[w]hile he paid no 
money, access was not free of a commitment to provide consideration in the form of 
that information, which was of value to Gannett”). 
 179. See Ellis, 803 F.3d at 1255 (determining that the information Ellis 
provided was not PII because it could not identify him on its own and needed to be 
combined with additional information to do so). 
 180. See 158 CONG. REC. H6849-50 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2012) (statement of 
Rep. Goodlatte) (explaining that the amendment was made to the VPPA in order to 
continue to protect consumers when online media use is so prevalent); see also 
Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, § 2, 
126 Stat. 2414, 2414 (amending the VPPA to allow for consumer consent to be 
provided online to protect privacy in the digital age). 
 181. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012) 
(describing that the VPPA was enacted “to preserve personal privacy with respect to 
rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials”); see 
also H.R. 3523, 100th Cong. (1987). Representative Al McCandless introduced 
House Bill 3523, which became the foundation for the VPPA “to preserve personal 
privacy with respect to the rental or purchase of video tapes by individuals.” Id. 
 182. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1820. 
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III. SUBSCRIBERS IN RELATION TO THE INFORMATION THEY 
PROVIDE 
In the 1960s, concerns about the sharing of personal 
information arose with the advent of computers.183 Fast-forward to 
today’s digital age, where so many transactions occur online, and 
such concerns reach new levels as individuals’ personal information 
is scattered across the Internet.184 Companies have realized consumer 
data’s inherent value to understand buyers’ habits, and a market for 
this data developed.185 A consumer’s personal information, including 
PII, has become a valuable commodity.186 
A. Who Is Collecting This Information, What Are They Collecting, 
and Why? 
Since the rise in Internet use in the 1990s, consumer 
transactions have overwhelmingly transformed to rely on online 
technology.187 As a result, individuals knowingly and unknowingly 
leave a trail of personal information as they travel through the online 
world.188 Almost simultaneously, the world of marketing and 
                                                 
 183. See id. (describing how “the rise of the computer . . . permitted public 
bureaucracies and private companies to process personal data. The computer did not 
merely increase the amount of information that entities collected—it changed how 
that data could be organized, accessed, and searched”). 
 184. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1394; see also Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. 
Hayes, Creating a “Circle Of Trust” to Further Digital Privacy and Cybersecurity 
Goals, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1475, 1483 (explaining how “[p]rivacy law has 
evolved over the last 125 years, with the issues becoming even more complicated in 
the last twenty years as the Internet grew in popularity”). 
 185. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1408 (explaining that companies with 
databases “are realizing that their databases are becoming one of their most valuable 
assets and are beginning to sell their data”). Solove explains how “[t]echnology 
enables the preservation of the minutia of our everyday comings and goings, of our 
likes and dislikes, of who we are and what we own. Companies are constructing 
gigantic databases of psychological profiles, amassing data about an individual’s 
race, gender, income, hobbies, and purchases.” Id. at 1394. 
 186. See Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576. Ciocchetti explains that “[b]uyers 
are incentivized to purchase PII because such information arrives prepackaged—
collected, mined, and correlated into categorized lists—and ready to use.” Id. 
 187. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1394 (explaining that the way we conduct 
our daily tasks has completely transformed to accommodate methods that depend on 
using digital technology).  
 188. See id. In this new digital era, the way we conduct our daily lives so 
heavily on the Internet has “resulted in an unprecedented proliferation of records and 
data. The small details that were once captured in dim memories or fading scraps of 
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advertising transformed in a related way.189 The bits and pieces of 
individuals’ information regarding their everyday lives have become 
incredibly valuable for the purpose of large-scale marketing 
strategies directed at particular groups or individuals.190 Companies 
use consumer information to create persuasive ads to convince 
consumers to buy their products or use their services.191 The ability to 
collect such information online has changed the world of 
marketing.192  
Beginning in the 1970s, companies began marketing to groups 
of consumers with similar interests and tastes.193 This strategy is 
known as targeted marketing, and it is considered the most 
successful form of marketing.194 Marketers quickly realized that 
targeted marketing was most effective, and thus most profitable, 
when they had access to more information.195 Given the abundance of 
personal information strewn throughout the Internet,196 a market 
dedicated to collecting online consumer data to sell to companies for 
marketing purposes developed into a booming industry.197 The two 
                                                                                                       
paper are now preserved forever in the digital minds of computers, vast databases 
with fertile fields of personal data.” Id.  
 189. See id. at 1404 (explaining the grand transition from local, small-scale 
marketing to mass marketing relying heavily on the use of consumers’ personal 
information obtained online).  
 190. See id.; see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1849 (“The holy 
grail of modern advertising is ‘one-to-one’ marketing . . . to create ‘advertising 
crafted to uniquely engage’ each individual. . . . [T]he idea is for advertisers to 
record a person’s behavior, analyze it, and shape the kinds of offers directed to that 
party based on the patterns that emerge.”). 
 191. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1404 (explaining how “corporations are 
desperate for whatever consumer information they can glean, and their quest for 
such information is hardly perceived by the general public as democratic”). 
 192. See id. at 1407 (describing how marketing companies work to collect as 
much information on consumers as possible and how the Internet makes this easier).  
 193. See id. at 1404-05 (explaining how “[t]he turn to targeting was spurred 
by the proliferation and specialization of mass media throughout the century, 
enabling marketers to tap into groups of consumers with similar interests and 
tastes”). 
 194. See id. at 1407.  
 195. See id. (explaining how the “effectiveness and profitability of targeted 
marketing depend upon data, and the challenge is to obtain as much of it as 
possible”). 
 196. See id. at 1408. Notably, “[t]he average consumer is on around 100 
mailing lists and is contained in at least fifty databases.” Id.  
 197. See id. at 1407-08 (describing the database industry as “an information 
age bazaar where personal data collections are bartered and sold”). “Over 550 
companies comprise the personal information industry with annual revenues in the 
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main ways an individual’s personal information is collected online 
are either through compiling information he or she provided through 
online transactions or by tracking an individual’s Internet browsing 
from site to site.198 
One very popular form of targeted marketing is behavioral 
marketing.199 Behavioral marketing involves tracking a person’s 
online conduct in order to create the most effective advertisements 
based on the advertiser’s collected information about the 
individual.200 Marketers are hired to track, collect, and organize 
information on individuals, and they gather data such as 
geographical location, recent purchases, and frequently viewed 
movies.201 The names of individuals are not usually linked to the 
compilation of data collected.202 However, companies are able to 
connect and combine consumer information to make it more 
pervasive.203 
B. How Is This Information Being Used? 
Because Internet use is inescapable, it has become the most 
common platform to collect and share consumers’ personal 
information.204 The more information that can be provided about an 
                                                                                                       
billions of dollars. The sale of mailing lists alone . . . generates three billion dollars a 
year.”). Id. 
 198. See id. at 1411. Solove explains that “there are two basic ways personal 
information is collected in cyberspace: (1) by directly collecting information from 
users (registration and transactional data); and (2) by surreptitiously tracking the 
way people navigate through the Internet (clickstream data).” Id.  
 199. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1849 (explaining that the goal 
in behavioral marketing is “for advertisers to record a person’s behavior, analyze it, 
and shape the kinds of offers directed to that party based on the patterns that emerge 
from this collected data”). 
 200. See id. (explaining how directed marketing is the ideal form of 
marketing to engage the individual with personal information). 
 201. See id. at 1851. Marketers access databases that track “people’s online 
and offline behavior. They are able to cross-reference online activity with offline 
records including home ownership, family income, marital status, zip code, and a 
host of other information, such as one’s recent purchases as well as favorite 
restaurants, movies, and TV shows.” Id. 
 202. See id. at 1855. 
 203. See Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People 
Uniquely 2 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Working Paper No. 3, 2000). Sweeney explains 
how “combinations of few characteristics [from the U.S. Census] often combine in 
populations to uniquely or nearly uniquely identify some individuals.” Id.  
 204. See Paige Norian, Comment, The Struggle to Keep Personal Data 
Personal: Attempts to Reform Online Privacy and How Congress Should Respond, 
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individual, the more an advertising company is willing to pay for 
it.205 Marketing agencies use software to create a dossier on each 
individual they have collected data from.206 Using personal data to 
arrange for a more personalized advertisement experience for 
consumers is one of the most popular and effective methods of 
advertising today,207 and anyone who can provide such data to a 
marketing company can earn a significant profit.208 
The facts from In re Hulu Privacy Litigation illustrate how a 
video service provider can collect data about users to make money 
from third parties.209 Originally, Hulu, a video service provider, made 
profits from running advertisements on its website and disclosing 
audience size to advertisers.210 However, Hulu began coordinating 
with Facebook to collect consumer information, thus changing 
Hulu’s model for generating revenue.211 Facebook makes money by 
sharing its users’ information with marketers to create targeted 
advertisements.212 When Hulu added a Facebook button to its watch 
pages, users who clicked the button were identified as Facebook 
users, and the social media site could see what content users were 
watching.213 This identification and trailing was used to track 
                                                                                                       
52 CATH. U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2003) (explaining how “[t]he Internet provides 
companies with the ability to collect information about their users and to distribute 
that information to others”). 
 205. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1854 (discussing how the 
FTC found that “the more that is known about someone, the more that advertisers 
will pay to send her an advertisement”). 
 206. See id. (explaining how companies have created mechanisms to track 
individuals and combine information that is collected on each of them individually).  
 207. See id. at 1849 (explaining how targeted marketing through the use of 
collected consumer personal information is very popular because it is so effective). 
 208. See id. (describing the huge market for buying and selling consumer 
information). 
 209. See generally In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1091 
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (assessing how a video content provider linked with a social media 
site to collect consumers’ information and shared it with marketers to create targeted 
advertisements). 
 210. See id. at 1093. (describing Hulu’s “main source of income [as] 
advertising revenue. Advertisers pay Hulu to run commercials . . . [and] pay Hulu 
based on how many times an ad is viewed”). 
 211. See id. at 1093-94. The case provides a detailed explanation of Hulu’s 
agreement with Facebook regarding information gathering. See id. 
 212. See id. at 1093. Facebook collects the information based on what 
Facebook users share and “provides that information to marketers. Facebook shares 
its members’ information with marketers so that they can target their ad campaigns.” 
Id.  
 213. See id. at 1093-94.  
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advertisement effectiveness, which eventually generated revenue for 
both Facebook and Hulu.214 
While directed advertising can be seen as beneficial to the 
economy,215 many individuals feel uncomfortable being tracked to 
receive advertising aimed specifically at them.216 When consumer 
data contains greater detail about an individual, the data’s value 
increases.217 Thus, PII is a very valuable commodity to marketers 
conducting targeted marketing because it directly links consumers to 
their digital actions.218 The purpose of the VPPA is to protect 
consumers’ PII.219 Given this legislative intent, any definition of 
subscriber under the VPPA must include an evaluation of whether 
the consumer has provided PII.220 Importantly, given the inherent 
value of PII, 221 it is logical that in providing such a valuable 
commodity, the consumer has forged a committed relationship with 
                                                 
 214. See id. at 1102-03. Facebook and Hulu would send the advertisement 
tracking information “to an advertiser[, which shows Hulu’s] ability to track 
advertising effectiveness through Facebook’s logged-in cookie.” Id. at 1103. 
 215. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1853-54 (explaining how it is 
possible that a free market economy could set its own price for consumer 
information and that “marketing online is a billion-dollar growth industry”). 
 216. See id. at 1853; see also Solove, supra note 43, at 1398 (describing how 
uncontrollable data collection has been described as a “dehumanizing” world, 
“where people feel powerless and vulnerable, without any meaningful form of 
participation in the collection and use of their information”). 
 217. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1854; see also Ciocchetti, 
supra note 38, at 576 (explaining how “[b]uyers are incentivized to purchase PII 
because such information arrives prepackaged—collected, mined, and correlated 
into categorized lists—and ready to use”). 
 218. See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) 
(2012) (defining PII as “information which identifies a person as having requested 
or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider”); 
see also Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 562 (explaining how “companies collect PII to: 
(1) facilitate and process transactions; (2) conduct marketing campaigns; (3) mine 
for demographics, clickstream data, purchasing behavior, and customer interests; 
and (4) sell for a fee”). 
 219. See § 2710(b); see also Video and Library Privacy Protection Act of 
1988, supra note 17, at 29-30 (explaining that this legislation was created to protect 
individuals’ privacy in their video-watching choices). 
 220. See infra Part IV (explaining that the VPPA’s intent is to protect 
consumers’ PII from being distributed by video content providers, thus necessitating 
that users who disclose PII to content providers be labeled as subscribers to 
adequately protects the Act’s intent). 
 221. See Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576 (explaining how valuable PII is, 
specifically in popular marketing and advertising strategies). 
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the video content provider that courts demand222—a status that 
qualifies the user as a subscriber.223 
IV. USERS WHO PROVIDE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE 
INFORMATION TO CONTENT PROVIDERS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 
SUBSCRIBERS AND AFFORDED PROTECTIONS UNDER THE VIDEO 
PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
In response to the challenge of determining when a user of a 
free cell phone app is considered a subscriber under the VPPA,224 any 
potential solution must involve utilizing another prominent term 
within the Act: PII.225 Because PII is widely understood to be 
information valuable enough to be protected,226 a consumer 
supplying such information in exchange for video content can be 
viewed as supplying consideration, thereby creating a contractual 
relationship between the content-user and the content-provider.227 A 
contractual relationship clearly evidences a commitment, thus 
elevating the consumer’s status to a protected subscriber standing.228 
                                                 
 222. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 489 
(1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that within the VPPA, the subscriber status is recognized 
as a heightened relationship between the consumer and video content provider); 
Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (emphasizing “casual consumption” of online media is not enough 
to qualify a consumer to be a subscriber). 
 223. See infra Part IV (proposing a definition of subscriber that protects 
individuals who provide PII in exchange for video content).   
 224. See Koo, supra note 27, at 38 (describing the discrepancies between the 
First Circuit’s and the Eleventh Circuit’s holdings on this issue); see generally 
Yershov, 820 F.3d 482 (evaluating whether a user downloading a free cellphone app 
should qualify as a subscriber under the VPPA); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 
F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) (same). 
 225. See infra Section IV.A (explaining how using the disclosure of PII to 
determine if an individual qualifies as a subscriber under the VPPA gives effect to 
the legislators’ intent for the Act and evidences the elevated commitment needed for 
the subscriber status).  
 226. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1816 (describing how 
“privacy regulation focuses on the collection, use, and disclosure of PII, and leaves 
non-PII unregulated”). 
 227. See Matwyshyn, supra note 35, at 8 (explaining how a consumer’s “act 
of sharing data is a form of legally sufficient consideration” to form a contract). The 
contract between the parties is essentially providing video content in exchange for 
PII. See id. 
 228. Courts have often discussed that the subscriber relationship under the 
VPPA requires a heightened relationship and something more than merely 
downloading a free cell phone app. See, e.g., Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489; Ellis, 803 
F.3d at 1257; Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 
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While there are potential drawbacks to any new strategy,229 given the 
current state of consumer privacy protection, recognizing PII’s value 
and understanding it as consideration to create a contractual 
relationship between consumers and providers will adequately 
protect what the VPPA intended—PII and consumer privacy.230 This 
solution addresses the need for specific parameters of who is a 
subscriber and provides the necessary privacy protection from the 
widespread sharing of personal data that occurs today.231 
A. Expanding on the First Circuit’s Analysis: Using PII as 
Consideration to Create a Contractual Relationship Between 
Consumer and Provider to Protect Subscribers  
The clearest way to determine whether a user of a free app is a 
subscriber under the VPPA is by building off of the First Circuit’s 
analysis in Yershov.232 In this case, Yershov downloaded a free app to 
his cell phone that collected his GPS coordinates, a unique cell 
phone identifier, and each video clip he watched; the app then shared 
this information with a data analytics and online marketing 
company.233 The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding 
that the information Gannett disclosed to the data analytics company 
qualified as PII.234 In the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that Yershov 
was a subscriber, it opined that Yershov’s provision of personal 
                                                                                                       
662, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that, within the VPPA, a subscriber is 
recognized as having a heightened relationship with the content provider). 
 229. See infra Section IV.B (reviewing counter arguments to this solution).  
 230. See infra Section IV.C (discussing the policy considerations and why 
this solution addresses the needs legislators recognized and attempted to rectify in 
creating the VPPA). 
 231. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1394 (describing the “information 
revolution” that has resulted in a “dramatic transformation in the way we shop, 
bank, and go about our daily business—changes that have resulted in an 
unprecedented proliferation of records and data”). 
 232. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (determining that, although Yershov did 
not pay for access to the video content, he provided “consideration in the form of 
that information,” which was of sufficient value to qualify him as a subscriber under 
the VPPA).  
 233. See id. at 484 (explaining how the USA Today Mobile App collected 
personally identifiable information and shared it with Adobe without Yershov’s 
permission).     
 234. See id. at 486 (concluding that because “Gannett disclosed information 
reasonably and foreseeably likely to reveal which USA Today videos Yershov has 
obtained,” this information was PII).  
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information was valuable and exemplified commitment.235 By 
expanding the court’s concept of subscriber, the elevated 
relationship that many courts have called for236 can be fulfilled by a 
simple contractual relationship. When consumers provide valuable 
PII to video content providers, it serves as consideration to form a 
contract between the parties because the consumer provides PII in 
exchange for video content.237 Thus, a user who provides PII for the 
use of an otherwise free video service app should be considered a 
subscriber under the VPPA and afforded the Act’s protections.238  
Under the VPPA, the definition of consumer includes a 
purchaser, renter, and subscriber.239 Legislators chose to include 
three separate terms and give each term its own unique meaning to 
avoid redundancy.240 Because purchaser and renter unequivocally 
                                                 
 235. See id. at 489. The court explained that:  
While he paid no money, access was not free of a commitment to provide 
consideration in the form of that information, which was of value to 
Gannett. And by installing the App on his phone, thereby establishing 
seamless access to an electronic version of USA Today, Yershov 
established a relationship with Gannett that is materially different from 
what would have been the case had USA Today simply remained one of 
millions of sites on the web that Yershov might have accessed through a 
web browser. 
Id. 
 236. See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2015) (concluding that downloading and using a free cell phone app cannot make 
the user a subscriber under the Act because “there is no ongoing commitment or 
relationship between the user and the entity which owns and operates the app”); see 
also Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (emphasizing “casual consumption” of online media is not enough 
to create a subscriber relationship). 
 237. See Matwyshyn, supra note 35, at 8 (concluding that a consumer 
providing personal information is sufficient in value to constitute consideration to 
form a contract between the parties).  
 238. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) 
(2012). The Act protects the PII of “subscribers,” “purchasers,” and “renters,” 
collectively known as “consumers.” See id.  
 239. See id. The VPPA defines consumer as a “renter, purchaser, or 
subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” Id.  
 240. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487 (determining that “if the term ‘subscriber’ 
required some sort of monetary payment, it would be rendered superfluous by the 
two terms preceding it”); see also § 2710(a)(1) (including three separate terms 
within the definition of consumer: purchaser, renter, and subscriber); Dastar Corp. 
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003) (holding that 
“statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course to be 
avoided”). 
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imply a monetary exchange,241 the term subscriber must mean 
something unique. Courts have agreed that an exchange of money is 
not a necessary feature of a subscriber relationship under the 
VPPA.242 However, in order to keep the definition of subscriber 
consistent with purchaser and renter, a subscriber must provide the 
video content provider with something to indicate a commitment 
between the parties.243 Because it can be bought and sold in its own 
market,244 consumer information should be treated as equivalent to a 
monetary exchange.245 
When a user of a free video content app shares PII with a video 
content provider, the user is providing the kind of value that 
evidences a commitment between the parties.246 A consumer should 
be afforded a subscriber’s level of protection when providing PII247 
because personal information is a valuable commodity that benefits 
the video content provider.248 Whether a consumer knowingly or 
unknowingly discloses PII to a video content provider, the video 
                                                 
 241. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487 (explaining that because both purchaser 
and renter indicate an exchange of money for permanent or temporary ownership, 
subscriber must have its own distinct meaning). 
 242. See id. at 488 (concluding that payment is not necessary for a user to be 
considered a subscriber under the VPPA). 
 243. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). Consumer is defined as “purchaser,” 
“renter,” or “subscriber,” and because purchaser and renter indicate a need for 
money in exchange for the video content, it would follow that subscriber would 
likely require something of value in exchange for video content as well. See id. See 
also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008) (explaining “the common-
sense canon of noscitur a sociis—which counsels that a word is given more precise 
content by the neighboring words with which it is associated” is helpful when 
discerning the meaning of an ambiguous statutory term). 
 244. See Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576 (explaining how valuable PII is 
because of its usefulness in creating effective direct marketing); see also Solove, 
supra note 43, at 1407-08 (describing how “[t]he database industry is an information 
age bazaar where personal data collections are bartered and sold”). 
 245. See Matwyshyn, supra note 35, at 8 (supporting the theory of consumer 
information having sufficient value to qualify as contractual consideration and thus 
forming a contractual relationship between consumers and service providers). 
 246. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (describing Yershov’s disclosure of 
personal information as a valuable exchange that evidenced a commitment).  
 247. See id. (describing how Yershov’s “access was not free of a 
commitment to provide consideration in the form of that information, which was of 
value to Gannett”). 
 248. See McClurg, supra note 39, at 71-72 (describing the extensive, billion-
dollar data mining industry and its efforts to collect and organize individuals’ 
personal information “because consumer information is an extremely valuable 
commercial asset”). 
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content provider benefits from it.249 Video content providers with 
access to PII have the opportunity to sell it or use it for their own 
marketing purposes.250 In either case, content providers reap the 
benefits;251 thus the valuable PII provided by the consumer serves as 
consideration to form a contract between the parties.252 In this 
contract, the video service provider provides video content to the 
consumer in exchange for PII.253 This contractual relationship serves 
as the heightened relationship that courts are looking for254 and 
indicates the commitment needed for a user to qualify for subscriber 
status and protection of his or her PII under the VPPA.255 
                                                 
 249. Companies collecting consumers’ PII can benefit from the information 
through marketing data. See, e.g., Yershov, 820 F.3d at 485 (explaining that Gannett 
gives its users’ PII to Adobe, and Adobe then creates digital dossiers, which give 
Adobe’s clients insight into consumers’ lives in order to create the most effective 
targeted advertisements for them). Alternatively, video content providers can sell the 
PII and gain huge profits. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1408 (explaining how 
companies with aggregated data on their users can sell this information as a new 
form of business).  
 250. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1408 (describing how “an increasing 
number of companies with databases . . . are realizing that their databases are 
becoming one of their most valuable assets and are beginning to sell their data, . . . 
[and] a new breed of firms devotes their primary business to the collection of 
personal information”). 
 251. Video content providers can benefit by making profits directly off the 
sale of consumers’ PII. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1854 (describing 
an entire marketplace devoted to buying and selling consumer information). Video 
content providers can also benefit by using the valuable PII in targeted marketing, 
which has proven to be very effective. See also Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576 
(explaining how personally identifiable information is so valuable in popular 
marketing strategies). 
 252. See Consideration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
Consideration is defined as “[s]omething (such as an act, a forbearance, or a return 
promise) bargained for and received by a promisor from a promisee; that which 
motivates a person to do something, [especially] to engage in a legal act.” Id. 
 253. See Matwyshyn, supra note 35, at 8 (supporting the theory that 
consumer information has sufficient value to qualify as contractual consideration 
and thus form a contractual relationship between a consumer and service provider). 
 254. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 489 (explaining that, within the VPPA, the 
subscriber status is recognized as a heightened relationship between the consumer 
and video content provider); Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 
F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (emphasizing “casual consumption” of online 
media is not enough to qualify a consumer to be a subscriber). 
 255. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D) 
(2012) (protecting consumers’ PII through penalizing video content providers who 
disclose consumers’ PII without consent).   
440 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
Beyond that, the VPPA was specifically created to protect 
consumers from the dissemination of PII.256 Today, the concern with 
the unbridled sharing of PII far extends initial privacy concerns257 
because of how prominently companies use consumer data in their 
marketing strategies.258 Video content providers with unregulated 
control over PII could have dangerous consequences for consumer 
privacy protection; if a content provider has access to a consumer’s 
PII, a heightened relationship already exists between the parties.259 
By disclosing PII to the content provider, consumers provide a 
valuable commodity and put themselves at risk for distribution of 
their private information; an individual who downloads a free app 
but does not exchange PII for video content does not face such risks 
or provide such benefits.260 Thus, a consumer’s act of downloading a 
free app in conjunction with the act of providing PII to this app’s 
content provider clearly indicates a commitment and evidences the 
heightened subscriber relationship that requires protection under the 
VPPA.261 
Further, content providers using and sharing PII as they please 
is the type of damage the VPPA aimed to protect.262 The easiest way 
                                                 
 256. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 
Stat. 3195, 3195 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)) (describing how 
the VPPA was enacted to “preserve personal privacy with respect to rental, 
purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials”). 
 257. See id.; see also Video and Library Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 
supra note 17, at 24 (explaining that the VPPA “stems from the incident . . . when a 
newspaper reporter found out from a video store what video films Judge Bork rented 
and published a story about his preferences” and sparked the concern for consumer 
privacy).  
 258. See Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576 (explaining how valuable PII is 
due to its usefulness in direct marketing). 
 259. See Recent Case, supra note 65, at 2018 (describing how problematic it 
would be if courts followed the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis and did not ensure 
protection for a user of a free app who provided personal information to the video 
content provider because “a similar application would be excluded from the VPPA 
and thus free to share any clearly personally identifiable information it gathered 
from one’s phone along with the viewing history,” which is “directly at odds with 
the mischief that the VPPA was enacted to protect against”). 
 260. See id. at 2019. 
 261. See § 2710(a)(1) (protecting the PII of subscribers); see also Austin-
Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (emphasizing “casual consumption” of online media is not enough to qualify a 
consumer to be a subscriber). 
 262. See Recent Case, supra note 65, at 2019 (explaining how the evaluation 
of what is considered PII is important when determining who qualifies as a 
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to ensure the goal of the legislation is met263 is to protect the 
individuals providing the exact information legislators deemed 
needed protection.264 Given the constant changes in technology, there 
is a higher demand for new ways to protect consumer data, and 
labeling the individuals who provide PII when receiving video 
content as subscribers ensures the protection of many individuals’ 
highly sensitive information.265 In a world where almost all 
transactions can occur online, downloading an app and subsequently 
disclosing PII is much more substantial than visiting a website, and it 
warrants higher protection.266  
With the many ways people are online sharing bits and pieces 
of their data, individuals leave information in many places.267 The 
culmination of seemingly general information can easily be 
combined to identify an individual.268 Information that at first appears 
to be non-PII can be pieced together to create PII.269 Given this 
substantial risk of identifying individuals with otherwise non-
                                                                                                       
subscriber under the VPPA because the Act was created to protect consumers’ PII); 
see also § 2710(b)(1). 
 263. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 
Stat. 3195, 3195 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)) (describing how 
the VPPA was enacted to “preserve personal privacy with respect to rental, 
purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials”); see also 
H.R. 3523, 100th Cong. (1987). Representative Al McCandless introduced House 
Bill 3523, which became the foundation for the VPPA “to preserve personal privacy 
with respect to the rental or purchase of video tapes by individuals.” Id.  
 264. See § 2710(d) (prohibiting video service providers from disclosing 
consumers’ PII to third parties). 
 265. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. H6849 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2012) (discussing 
how to best amend the VPPA to continue to protect consumers when online media 
use is so prevalent); see also Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits 
and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 86 (2002). 
 266. See Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 489 
(1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that downloading an app is a more substantial 
commitment than visiting a web page because “by installing the App on his phone 
. . . Yershov established a relationship with Gannett that is materially different from 
what would have been the case had USA Today simply remained one of millions of 
sites on the web that Yershov might have accessed through a web browser”). 
 267. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 264, at 103 (discussing the 
“immense amounts of data about any given individual already in the public 
domain”). 
 268. See Sweeney, supra note 202, at 2. A study at Carnegie Mellon 
University indicated that 87% of individuals in the United States could be identified 
simply by the combination of their zip code, date of birth, and gender. Id.  
 269. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1842 (explaining how 
“[t]echnology increasingly enables the combination of various pieces of non-PII to 
produce PII”). 
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identifying information, it is essential to protect individuals who 
provide information that, on its face, identifies them—PII.270 The best 
way to protect this valuable and personal information as the VPPA 
was intended to271 is to protect the class of individuals who provide 
PII in exchange for video content as subscribers.  
B. Resistance to Protecting PII-Providing Subscribers Under a 
Contractual Relationship 
An important concern with labeling an individual providing PII 
in exchange for free video content as a subscriber relates to the 
economic benefits associated with sharing consumers’ personal 
information.272 Fewer regulations on consumer personal information 
promote societal and economic growth through free exchange of 
information.273 Additionally, freely flowing PII can result in 
economic benefits due to lower prices and thriving businesses caused 
by successful advertising.274 While these benefits are possible, a 
country of consumers would benefit from structure and predictability 
in their information privacy more than lower prices,275 particularly in 
                                                 
 270. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) 
(2012) (defining PII as “includ[ing] information which identifies a person as having 
requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service 
provider”). 
 271. See id.   
 272. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 264, at 146-50 (describing how 
mandating limitations on the sharing of consumers’ personal information is 
unnecessary and would have detrimental effects on the economy).  
 273. See id. at 146-47 (explaining that a mandate to limit personal 
information sharing in a contract form would “significantly reduce the economic 
gains from trading information” and negatively impact all of society).  
 274. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reactions to the FCC’s Proposed Privacy 
Regulations, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 5-6 (June 8, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/955183/160608kelly
drye.pdf [https://perma.cc/L45H-Z63G] (describing “burdens imposed by overly 
restrictive privacy regulation, such as broad opt-in requirements for non-sensitive 
data, may also slow innovation and growth, harming all consumers”). 
 275. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1853. Many people feel as 
though the sharing of their information without their knowledge for marketing 
purposes is “deceptive, otherwise unfair, or even [] a force capable of chilling their 
free behavior. Moreover, the very complexity of the marketing ecosystem heightens 
the general ignorance of these corporate techniques, and reduces the value of the 
tools that some companies are making available to users.” Id.  
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light of the recent changes in the scope of the FTC’s and FCC’s 
powers to protect consumer information.276 
Further, in Austin-Spearman, the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York critiqued this type of 
solution.277 The court determined that defining subscriber as an 
individual who has provided personal information to the content 
provider would render the consumer clause of the Act superfluous.278 
While it is true that courts must avoid any statutory interpretation 
that reduces a portion of the statute to be redundant,279 such an 
interpretation does not render the consumer clause superfluous.280 
Within the VPPA, consumer is defined as “any renter, purchaser, or 
subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service 
provider.”281 Defining subscriber as a user who provides PII in 
exchange for video content from the video content provider ensures 
that subscriber retains a unique meaning because neither purchaser 
nor renter share such a definition.282  
                                                 
 276. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 835 F.3d 993, 1003 
(9th Cir. 2016) (removing regulation of common carriers from the scope of the 
FTC’s jurisdiction); see also Diener, supra note 9 (noting the FCC’s new 
regulations’ failure to regulate edge providers). 
 277. See Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 
662, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing why labeling subscribers as users who provide 
personal information is a problematic categorization). In 2015, the court reviewed a 
consumer’s use of AMC’s website to watch television shows. See id. at 664 
(explaining that “AMC maintains a website that provides information about its 
television programming, on which it offers video clips and episodes of many of its 
television shows”). 
 278. Id. at 670. The court explains that:  
[T]urning “subscription” into a mere proxy for whether the provider has 
received access to personal information . . . all but writes out the statute’s 
limitation to “consumers,” as the requirement that the provider have 
disclosed personal information necessarily presupposes that it gained 
access to such information, therefore rendering the “consumer” clause 
superfluous. 
Id.  
 279. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 
(2003) (explaining that “statutory interpretation that renders another statute 
superfluous is of course to be avoided”). 
 280. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) 
(2012) (defining consumer as a “renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services 
from a video tape service provider”); see also Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that each of the three 
terms within the definition of consumer in the VPPA retains its own unique 
meaning).  
 281. § 2710(a)(1). 
 282. See Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487. The court in Yershov stated that: 
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This proposed solution is also more specific than the broad 
definition the court warned against283 because it uniquely requires an 
exchange of PII, not just any personal information, to be considered 
a subscriber. Legislators who created the VPPA strived to 
specifically protect consumers’ personally identifiable information.284 
In various other federal statutes involving PII, concluding if 
information is PII requires a threshold determination of whether the 
information identifies an individual; if it does not, the information is 
not protected.285 PII is widely understood to be important and 
valuable, which is why it often triggers privacy protection.286 
Logically, the best way to protect the collection of information 
legislators proposed to safeguard is to protect the consumers who 
disclose this information to video content providers. 287 Consumer 
information is all over the Internet,288 and choosing to set a higher 
standard for the protection of the most valuable information289 is 
appropriate because the VPPA’s purpose is to protect PII.290 
                                                                                                       
[A] person in 1988 who exchanged payment for a copy of a video either 
retained ownership of the video outright, thereby becoming a “purchaser” 
of the video, or received temporary possession of the video for a set period 
of time, thereby becoming a “renter.” Congress would have had no need to 
include a third category of persons protected under the Act if it had 
intended that only persons who pay money for videos be protected, which 
militates against an interpretation of the statute incorporating such an 
element. 
Id. 
 283. See Austin-Spearman, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 670. 
 284. See § 2710(b). The VPPA specifically penalizes video service providers 
who disclose consumers’ PII. See id. (describing how “[a] video tape service 
provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable 
information concerning any consumer of such provider shall be liable to the 
aggrieved person”). 
 285. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1816 (explaining how 
“[i]nformation privacy law rests on . . . Personally Identifiable Information (PII). 
Information that falls within this category is protected, and information outside of it 
is not”). 
 286. See id. (describing how “PII is one of the most central concepts in 
privacy regulation. It defines the scope and boundaries of a large range of privacy 
statutes and regulations. Numerous federal statutes turn on this distinction”). 
 287. See § 2710(b) (explaining how “[a] video tape service provider who 
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning 
any consumer of such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person”). 
 288. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1394 (describing how small portions of 
information are left scattered throughout the Internet as individuals conduct their 
daily online tasks).  
 289. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1816 (explaining that PII is a 
very important concept because a plethora of legislation relies on this term to set 
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A final concern surrounding many data-privacy regulations is 
triggered by concerns for property rights and free expression because 
the concept of “privacy-as-property”—giving individuals a right to 
their own personal information—risks violating the First 
Amendment.291 There is concern that legitimizing a marketplace for 
information will not fix privacy problems292 but will create greater 
confusion because personal data are forms of facts, and giving 
someone the ability to own facts could damage freedom of 
expression.293 However, scholars have noted that contract law serves 
as a better protection for First Amendment rights than tort 
remedies.294 Regulating the disbursement of PII as a contracted 
exchange of PII for video content gives consumers the decision-
making power to determine where and to whom their information 
goes, and this autonomy protects their own freedom of expression by 
protecting a consumer’s own “speech.”295 Labeling consumer 
information as a commodity that can be controlled and exchanged 
protects consumers’ interests and rights to use their identity as they 
choose.296 
                                                                                                       
parameters and thresholds and that a more precise definition is necessary for the 
term). 
 290. See § 2710(b)(1). The VPPA specifically aims to prevent and penalize 
video service providers from disclosing consumers’ PII without permission. See id.  
 291. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1294 (2000) (explaining how “[p]roperty rights in any sort of 
information raise significant policy and free speech issues”). Litman further explains 
that to “recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may be 
privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict the uses to which 
that fact may be put. That notion is radical.” Id. at 1294-95. 
 292. See id. at 1301 (noting that a “market in personal data is the problem. 
Market solutions based on a property rights model won’t cure it; they’ll only 
legitimize it”). 
 293. See id. at 1294. Facts are “building blocks of expression; of self-
government; and of knowledge itself. When we recognize property rights in facts, 
we endorse the idea that facts may be privately owned and that the owner of a fact is 
entitled to restrict the uses to which that fact may be put.” Id. 
 294. See Matwyshyn, supra note 35, at 38 (explaining that “a contract-based 
construction of privacy avoids the First Amendment pitfalls that may accompany 
many tort-based and other statutory approaches”). 
 295. See id. at 39. Scholars have discussed how allowing individuals to 
control their own privacy may even further protect First Amendment rights because 
“consumers seek control over ‘selectively embedding’ their identities and 
information into various economic contexts—an act of economic self-realization” 
and thus, involves their freedoms of speech and expression. Id.  
 296. See id. (explaining how “[c]onsumers want the ability to control the 
audience for their online speech in the ways they would otherwise be able to control 
in physical space. The practical dynamics of the consumer privacy debate are driven 
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C. What Will Happen in the Future: Policy Considerations 
As technology quickly evolves, legislation cannot keep up.297 
Consumers need protection—particularly in light of the change in 
who regulates privacy rights.298 Due to the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
discussed above,299 greater clarity is needed for undefined terms in 
the VPPA because of the FTC’s new limited scope.300 In the past, the 
FTC took on most issues regarding protection of personal 
information.301 However, there is now concern that any content 
provider can evade review of its consumer privacy procedures 
simply by acquiring a form of communication sufficient to gain 
common-carrier status.302 Moreover, federal statutes that work to 
protect consumers’ information, such as the VPPA, will become 
extremely useful in helping to curb the spread of consumer 
information, particularly in situations in which a common carrier 
also serves as a video content provider—a noted loophole in the 
FTC’s and FCC’s protections. 303  
                                                                                                       
in large part by this consumer interest in limited self-commodification and 
controlled economic self-realization”). 
 297. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1872 (describing how setting 
standards for labeling PII is challenging because of how quickly technology evolves 
and “the technology of tracking and the science of re-identification will continue to 
develop in ways that legal decision makers are unlikely to anticipate”). 
 298. See generally Fung, supra note 2 (explaining that the new challenges of 
determining particular privacy regulation situations fall within the purview of the 
FCC or the FTC).  
 299. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 835 F.3d 
993 (9th Cir. 2016) (determining that the FTC’s jurisdiction over common carriers 
should be eliminated because common carriers are under the purview of the FCC). 
 300. See Fung, supra note 2; see generally AT&T, 835 F.3d at 1003 (making 
a determination that limited the FTC’s jurisdiction over common carriers).  
 301. See Fung, supra note 2 (referring to the FTC as “the government’s top 
privacy watchdog”). 
 302. See id. (stating that “[a] company . . . could acquire its own broadband 
provider and claim common-carrier status. As a consequence . . . any company with 
telephony or broadband operations could engage in fraudulent or misleading activity 
of any kind without risk of blowback from the federal government”). 
 303. See id. (explaining how “[b]etween the FCC’s inability to regulate 
much beyond the communications-related units of a company and the FTC’s 
newfound prohibition on regulating any part of a company that owns a 
communications business, the 9th Circuit decision creates a gap in consumer 
protection law”).  
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Given the high demand for consumer information,304 and in 
particular the increased value for more particularized information, 
PII is unsurprisingly highly sought after.305 Because of its ability to 
identify a specific individual, protecting PII must be the focus when 
determining who a subscriber is under the VPPA.306 In order to carry 
out the intent of the VPPA, consumers who provide PII to video 
content providers in exchange for free video content should be 
afforded protection under the Act as subscribers.307 This protection is 
necessary in order to continue protecting consumers’ PII even as the 
FTC has lost some jurisdiction in this area.308  
Because nothing about the VPPA needs to be changed to 
implement this solution—just a precise meaning of an undefined 
term needs to be affirmed—the simplest way for this definition of 
subscriber to be confirmed would be for the Supreme Court to rule 
on a case involving this issue.309 If either Yershov310 or Ellis311 were 
brought before the Supreme Court, it would give the Court the 
opportunity to rule that a consumer sharing PII with a video content 
provider on a free app in exchange for otherwise free content creates 
a contractual relationship between the parties, which qualifies the 
consumer to be a subscriber under the VPPA and thus affords the 
                                                 
 304. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1407-08. (stating that “[t]he sale of 
mailing lists alone (not including the sales generated by the use of the lists) 
generates three billion dollars a year”). 
 305. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1854 (explaining that the 
more information available about an individual, the more companies are willing to 
pay for it); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 576 (explaining how valuable PII is 
because of its usefulness in direct marketing because it directly identifies an 
individual). 
 306. See supra Section IV.A (arguing that a determination of which 
consumers qualify as subscribers under the VPPA requires a strategy based on what 
the VPPA specifically protects—PII). 
 307. See supra Section IV.A (arguing that because the VPPA aims to protect 
consumers from video content providers distributing their PII, when consumers do 
provide such valuable information to providers, it should be protected).  
 308. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 835 F.3d 993, 1003 
(9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the FTC can no longer regulate common carriers).  
 309. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (2012). 
Because the VPPA is an accepted piece of legislation and enacting this solution 
would only require a ruling on the meaning of the term and application of a precise 
definition, a ruling from the Supreme Court would be able to address these needs 
without amending the VPPA itself. See id.  
 310. See generally Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 
482 (1st Cir. 2016).  
 311. See generally Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 
2015).  
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user the Act’s protections.312 This suggested contractual method of 
delegating who is a subscriber is true to the intent of the Act because 
it continues to prevent an individual’s PII from being used against 
him or her.313 
In a world where personal information is commoditized,314 and 
the use of cell phone apps is immensely prevalent,315 PII’s inherent 
value must be recognized if the intent of the VPPA is to be upheld.316 
Given the rapid spread of an individual’s information online, it is not 
currently feasible to protect against a video content provider’s use of 
any information because there is too much out there.317 However, 
choosing to create a heightened exchange, creating a contractual 
relationship only for the most personal of information—PII—would 
mark the continued protection of the original intent of the Act.318 
CONCLUSION 
The VPPA was created to protect consumers’ privacy rights.319 
If a consumer and provider of video content share a relationship of 
enough significance to compel the consumer to share PII, the 
                                                 
 312. See § 2710(a)(1). The Act prevents disclosure of the PII of “buyers,” 
“renters,” and “subscribers” of video content. See id.  
 313. See id. The Act prevents unlawful disclosure of a consumer’s PII. See 
id.  
 314. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1407-08 (describing how “[t]he increasing 
thirst for personal information spawned the creation of a new industry: the database 
industry”). 
 315. See Christian de Looper, Apple Announces 100 Billion App Downloads 
Since App Store Launch, TECH TIMES (June 8, 2015, 2:40 PM), 
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/58867/20150608/apple-announces-100-billion-
app-downloads-store-launch.htm [https://perma.cc/Q5GT-J99J] (discussing the 
prominence of apps in today’s culture and noting that “the average person has 119 
apps”). 
 316. See generally Matwyshyn, supra note 35, at 8 (supporting the theory of 
consumer information having sufficient value to qualify as contractual consideration 
and thus forming a contractual relationship between consumers and service 
providers).  
 317. See Solove, supra note 43, at 1394 (explaining how the constant use of 
the Internet has led to a collection of information on individuals and their online 
transactions).  
 318. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 
Stat. 3195, 3195 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)). The VPPA was 
enacted to “preserve personal privacy with respect to the rental, purchase, or 
delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials.” Id.  
 319. See id.; see also H.R. 3523, 100th Cong. (1987). Representative Al 
McCandless introduced House Bill 3523 “to preserve personal privacy with respect 
to the rental or purchase of video tapes by individuals.” Id.  
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relationship is significant enough for the consumer to qualify as a 
subscriber.320 Thus, if an individual downloads a free cell phone app 
and provides PII in order for a provider to supply said consumer with 
video content, this consumer should be considered a subscriber under 
the VPPA and afforded such protections.321 A lot has changed since 
1988, when the VPPA was enacted,322 but it is still a crucial concern 
to protect the privacy of technology users.323 This Note’s proposed 
solution to label an individual providing PII to a video content 
provider in exchange for otherwise free video content as a subscriber 
is the most effective way to adequately protect consumers.324 Most 
Americans are concerned about the safety of their information 
online.325 This proposed solution addresses these fears as it limits the 
spread of consumers’ most personal information—PII.326 As the 
world of technology has continued to evolve and grow, the need to 
protect consumers’ privacy that was identified in 1988 has persisted, 
                                                 
 320. See supra Section IV.A (describing how the intrinsic value of PII can 
serve as consideration to form a contract between consumer and video content 
provider so as to qualify the consumer as a subscriber under the VPPA and afford 
him or her protections under the Act).  
 321. See supra Section IV.A (explaining that a consumer providing such 
valuable PII creates the heightened relationship that courts have sought after for the 
subscriber relationship); see also Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 820 
F.3d 482, 488-89 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that, within the VPPA, the subscriber 
status is recognized as a heightened relationship between the consumer and video 
content provider); Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t L.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 3d 
662, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (emphasizing that “casual consumption” of online media 
is not enough to qualify a consumer to be a subscriber). 
 322. See Recent Case, supra note 65, at 2011 (explaining that although the 
VPPA originally was aimed to protect consumers from physical video stores, it “has 
seen a newfound applicability in the modern era of streaming video and ‘big data’ 
analytics”). 
 323. See id. (describing how although consumers’ worlds have changed 
given the new ways they interact with the technology in their lives, the VPPA still 
retains the purpose of protecting consumers’ privacy when interacting with video 
content providers).  
 324. See supra Section IV.A (explaining how this solution achieves the 
VPPA’s intent to protect consumers’ PII from being distributed by video content 
providers and adequately defines the undefined term subscriber in a world where 
online interactions are at an all-time high); see also Video Privacy Protection Act of 
1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (2012) (failing to provide a definition for subscriber); 
Norian, supra note 203, at 809 (describing the high frequency of online consumer 
transactions). 
 325. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 42, at 1815 (explaining that 
“Americans are extremely concerned about privacy, both on and off the Internet”). 
 326. See supra Section IV.A (describing how this solution works to protect 
consumers’ PII). 
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and because technology has become interwoven into everyday life, 
concern for consumers’ privacy protection has developed into more 
of an issue than ever before.327 
                                                 
 327. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 
Stat. 3195 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)) (identifying the need to 
protect consumers’ PII); see also Norian, supra note 203, at 809 (explaining that the 
increased use of the Internet to complete daily tasks has sparked the need to protect 
consumers’ privacy).  
